

TRANSMITTAL

To:

THE COUNCIL

Date:

OCT 16 2013

From:

THE MAYOR

TRANSMITTED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. PLEASE SEE ATTACHED.



(Ana Guerrero)

ERIC GARCETTI
Mayor

CITY OF LOS ANGELES
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE



Date: October 2, 2013

To: Eric Garcetti, Mayor

From: Anna Burton, Executive Assistant
Emergency Operations Board

A handwritten signature in purple ink that reads "Anna Burton".

Subject: **DECEMBER 2012 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)
FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE ACTIVATION AFTER ACTION REPORT**

At its September 16, 2013, meeting, the Emergency Operations Board approved the attached December 2012 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Exercise Activation After Action Report and recommended it be forwarded to the Mayor for approval and forwarding to the City Council.

Executive Summary

On December 5, 2012, the City of Los Angeles EOC was activated in support of a functional exercise. The exercise was designed to evaluate how EOC components work with participating Departmental Operations Centers to gather, vet, and document critical information for incident prioritization.

The attached Exercise Activation After Action Report was approved by the Emergency Operations Board at its September 16, 2013, meeting. This report identifies the departments involved in the EOC activation and a chronology of activities. This report also provides a summary of the event, recommendations and corrective actions specific to the activation to the EOC. EMD will track these recommendations for improvement and, as appropriate, report back through the Emergency Operations Organization.

With your approval, this report should be forwarded to the City Council with the attached transmittal for its information and file.

Attachment - December 2012 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Exercise Activation After Action Report

c: Eileen Decker, Deputy Mayor for Homeland Security and Public Safety

CITY OF LOS ANGELES
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE



Date: September 9, 2013

To: Charlie Beck, Chair
Emergency Operations Board

Emergency Operations Board Members

From: Anna Burton, Executive Assistant
Emergency Operations Board

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Anna Burton". The signature is written in a cursive style and is positioned over the printed name and title of the sender.

Subject: **DECEMBER 2012 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)
FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE ACTIVATION AFTER ACTION REPORT**

Recommendation

That the Emergency Operations Board, as recommended by the Emergency Management Committee, approve and forward to the Mayor for transmittal to the City Council, the December 2012 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Exercise Activation After Action Report.

Executive Summary

On December 5, 2012, the City of Los Angeles EOC was activated in support of functional exercise. The exercise was designed to evaluate how EOC components work with participating Departmental Operations Centers (DOCs) to gather, vet, and document critical information for incident prioritization.

The attached report represents a summarization of individual reports from each of the involved agencies. This report was approved by the Emergency Management Committee at its August 7, 2013, meeting with the recommendation it be forwarded to the Board for approval. If approved, EMD will forward the report to the Mayor for transmittal to the City Council.

EMD will track areas recommended for improvement and, as appropriate, report back through the Emergency Operations Organization.

Attachment - December 2012 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Exercise Activation After Action Report

CITY OF LOS ANGELES

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE



Date: July 26, 2013

To: Anna Burton, Chair
Emergency Management Committee

Emergency Management Committee Members

From: Quentin M. Frazier, Training & Exercise Unit Leader
Emergency Management Department

Subject: **DECEMBER 2012 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)
FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE ACTIVATION AFTER ACTION REPORT**

Recommendation

- (1) Approval of the attached December 2012 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Exercise After-Action Report (AAR) by the Emergency Management Committee (EMC) and
- (2) Forwarding the AAR to the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) for approval.

Executive Summary

On December 5, 2012, the City of Los Angeles EOC conducted a Functional Exercise. The Exercise was designed to evaluate how EOC Components work with participating Department Operating Centers (DOCs) to use critical information for incident prioritization, gather information, properly vet information, document the incident response, report information, and make decisions.

All EOC staff were required to document and demonstrate the movement of incident information based on the Coordination activities they undertook, information received from other Sections, and Status Reports from their Department or Agency. The process then required sharing this information with their EOC Supervisor or Manager for timely evaluation and prioritization. As demonstrating the movement of any priority information requiring immediate attention is important to EOC operations, EOC supervisors were required to determine, based upon the information supplied to them, what specific information to include in the Situation Report updates for EOC Management, during both the EOC Coordination and Planning meetings.

The primary basis for Exercise evaluation was whether established processes were implemented and carried out. Evaluation focused on determining how effectively

information was shared and reported, as required under City of Los Angeles EOC Coordination Planning protocols. Exercise injects were utilized for each activated EOC position, to prompt specific information flow up and down the EOC organization, and to provide both general and contextual information that would prompt expected actions.

The scope of play for this EOC Functional Exercise required EOC Responders to perform EOC-specific actions usually associated with the continuing response to major fire incidents likely to occur within the City of Los Angeles. These actions included:

1. Effective EOC Management;
2. Developing Situational Awareness & Sharing a Common Operating Picture;
3. Both Inter- and Intra- EOC Communications; and
4. Public Information.

This Functional Exercise scenario was specifically designed *not* to practice how City Departments would *tactically* respond, but how the EOC would respond. Specifically, the Exercise aimed to drive, and then evaluate *how* information collection, information sharing, and decision-making within the EOC may facilitate effective EOC Management, decision-making, and coordination activities, both within the EOC and with participating DOCs.



EOC Functional Exercise

After Action Report

December 5, 2012



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I. EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

A. Event Name

2012 City of Los Angeles EOC Functional Exercise

B. Event Date

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

C. Exercise Time/Duration

Exercise scenario information injections (referred to as 'injects'), began to be fed into LAPD's Real-Time Analysis and Critical Response (RACR) and LAFD's Fire Metro at 0645 hours.

Exercise play ended at approximately 1400 hours. An Exercise review ('hot-wash') occurred immediately after Exercise termination for EOC Policy Section, Management Section, and Coordination staffs, as well as Exercise Controllers and Evaluators.

D. Activation Level

The EOC was activated to a Level III Alpha (Fire Lead).

E. Lead Agency

The Los Angeles City EOC operated under Unified Command, with LAFD functioning as the EOC Director, and with LAPD and EMD acting as EOC Deputy Directors.

F. Participating, Supporting & Cooperating Agencies

- Office of the Mayor
- City Administrative Officer (CAO)
- City Attorney's Office
- Emergency Management Department (EMD)
- Fire Department (LAFD)

- Department of General Services (GSD)
- Information Technology Agency (ITA)
- Police Department (LAPD)
- Department of Public Works (DPW)
- Department of Recreation and Parks (RAP)
- Department of Transportation (DOT)
- Department of Water and Power (DWP)
- Department of Building & Safety (LADBS)
- LA World Airports (LAWA)
- Port of Los Angeles (POLA)
- Department on Disability (DOD)
- American Red Cross (ARC)
- Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD)
- Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management (LA Co. OEM)

G. Exercise Event Chronology

The Escalon Fire

At approximately 1630 hours on Tuesday December 4th, a fire broke out on Escalon Drive (south of Empanada Place). The fire was located north of Sunset Boulevard and west of I-405. The fire was caused by a backyard barbeque that flared up and ignited nearby vegetation, which then quickly spread due to high winds out of the East/Northeast.

When LAFD units arrived on scene, they found the home as the "point of origin" as well as the neighboring residences to the South heavily engulfed with fire, with over an acre of heavy brush burning uphill and wind driven. The residences and other structures along Escalon Drive to the South of the fire were immediately threatened. When LAFD helicopter assets arrived, they immediately reported that the fire was spotting (causing spot fires) a quarter to a third of a mile ahead of the main fire. Immediate evacuations were ordered on Escalon Drive, south of the incident to Encino Hills Drive (including the side streets of Clemons Drive, Standish Place, and Ardsley Place), as well as Escalon Drive, north of the incident to Empanada Place (including Montuso Place and Encino Verde Place). The fire was dubbed **the Escalon Fire**.

Based on how rapidly this fire grew and with call for evacuations, the Emergency Management Department (EMD) made the decision at 1900 hours to activate the City EOC to a Level I (City Watch) with EMD personnel, along with representatives from Recreation and Parks (RAP) and the American Red Cross (ARC), to assist with shelter coordination support.

An Evacuation Center was established at the Balboa Sports Center (17015 Burbank Boulevard, Encino). With the expansion of the Escalon Fire, representatives from both LAFD and LAPD were requested for the Level 1 EOC activation to assist with gathering and maintaining Situational Awareness information.

The fire initially destroyed the home at the point of origin and the neighboring residence to the south. Several homes and other buildings immediately south of the location along Escalon Drive were also damaged. Structure protection along Escalon Drive and the surrounding side streets minimized the potential for damage. As the evening progressed, the fire continued spreading West/Southwest and the Evacuation Center was converted to an Emergency Shelter overnight.

At 2230 hours, the fire crossed Mulholland Drive and began to threaten upper Mandeville Canyon, prompting evacuation orders for all residences above Sherry Lane and voluntary evacuation warnings below Sherry Lane to Garden Land Road. The fire also spread west and began to encroach into the neighborhoods to the west of the Encino Reservoir, prompting evacuation orders for Alonzo Avenue, Rock Hampton Drive, and Hilton Head Way, along with voluntary evacuation warnings for several surrounding side streets.

At approximately 0100 hours (December 5th), the winds began to shift out of the northeast and continued shifting north/northeast around 0230 hours and out of the north around 0400 hours, causing the fire to make a curve south.

The Beverly Glen Fire

At approximately 0630 hours on Wednesday, December 5, 2012, several 9-1-1 calls began coming in from morning commuters reporting another brush fire in the area of Beverly Glen Boulevard, south of Knobhill Drive.

At approximately 0650 hours, the first arriving LAFD resources report over one acre of heavy brush fully involved burning uphill and wind driven, with homes above the point of origin along Beverly Glen Terrace already engulfed in fire. Additional residences above Beverley Glen Terrace and along Mulholland Drive are also threatened.

LAFD immediately began taking up structure protection assignments and initiated evacuations for all of Beverly Glen Terrace and for Mulholland Drive, between Nicada Drive (to the east) and Woodcliff Road (to the west), including Kings Court and Stone Ridge Lane.

The fire continued to burn in a southwest direction, quickly racing uphill with help of spotting (spot fires) and crowning (fire running through the crowns of adjacent

trees). By 0700 hours, the fire had engulfed the homes along Mulholland above Beverly Glen Terrace and was making a run to jump Mulholland Drive.

By 0730 hours, the fire had jumped Mulholland Drive and was beginning its run down Stone Canyon continuing to spread South/Southwest. This fire is named **the Beverly Glen Fire**.

II. EXERCISE SYNOPSIS

A. Major Exercise Developments (Follow-On Reports)

All scenario information after 0730 hours was provided as 'information injects' to exercise participants in the EOC as they arrived and began activating their positions. Simulated off-going sets of Management & Coordination Staffs provided a situational update on the incident to the in-coming Management & Coordination Staffs as the exercise progressed, with further scenario information being delivered directly into LAPD and LAFD's Department Operating Centers (DOCs).

At 0830 hours, **the Beverly Glen Fire** began to ignite the homes at the east end of Kings Court and was well established in the brush of Stone Canyon. The only favorable aspect of the situation was that the fire then had to burn mainly downhill, down Stone Canyon. However, the fire was still wind-driven and the winds were beginning to steadily increase (winds consistently in the high 20's with steadily increasing gusts in the high 30's to low 40's).

The **Escalon Fire** was continuing to grow slowly, however several dozer lines had been established, and the fire was burning in an uninhabited area.

At 0930 hours, **the Beverly Glen Fire** has spread down Stone Canyon and has just gone past the Upper Stone Canyon Reservoir. The fire has destroyed most of the homes on Kings Court and is now threatening homes along the western flank of the fire, including homes at the eastern tip of Antelo Place and along Roscomare Road from Hamner to Belcanto. The winds in the area have significantly increased (winds are around 38 mph with gusts ranging from 49 to 55 mph).

Significant progress had been made on **the Escalon Fire**. This fire was estimated to be 60% to 70% contained; however, it was still growing slowly as it continued moving to the south towards an uninhabited area.

By 0945 hours, **the Beverly Glen Fire** began to spread into the Stone Ridge Lane area. The fire had engulfed a few homes along Roscomare Road and was encroaching on Antelo Place. The homes burning on Roscomare Road caused the fire to get a foothold. Additionally, with the high winds and gusts, the fire quickly began leapfrogging south along Roscomare Road, Stradella Road, and Linda Flora Road. The fire became wind-driven down Roscomare Canyon, causing a conflagration that stretched south from Roscomare/Hamner Drive. Firefighting efforts were hampered due to hydrant pressure issues in the area.

By 1030 hours many of the homes along Roscomare Road, Stradella Road, Linda Flora Road, Hamner Drive, and Nalin Drive were burning.

By 1130 hours, **The Beverly Glen Fire** had spread further west, destroyed several more homes, and was now threatening several more homes.

B. Core Capabilities Exercised

The 2012 EOC Functional Exercise objectives, scenario, and evaluation criteria were designed to meet the selected Core Capabilities. The purpose of this Exercise was to measure and validate performance of the identified target Core Capabilities and their associated critical tasks.

The primary Core Capability selected for evaluation was:

- Operational Coordination

The following Core Capabilities were also incorporated into the exercise:

- Operational Communications
- Mass Care Services
- Public Information and Warning

C. Exercise Objectives

Operational Coordination

- 1. Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management** - Demonstrate the EOC coordination process (preparation for and conduct of the Coordination and Planning Meetings).

- A. Establish and maintain Situational Awareness to develop a Common Operating Picture of the incident.
- B. Demonstrate the information flow process that occurs between the EOC and activated DOCs.
- C. Demonstrate the preparation activities and conduct of both the Coordination and Planning Meetings.

Operational Communications

2. Communications (Inter- & Intra- EOC) - Assess the City's ability to establish and maintain a multi-disciplinary communication process between the EOC and activated DOCs during the response.

- A. Confirm the documented process for communications flow between the DOCs and EOCs,
- B. Assess the processes' impact on decision-making.

Mass Care Services

3. Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services) - Based upon incident specifics, ensure the Operations Section/Mass Care Branch develops an approved Mass Reception and Shelter Plan for the affected population.

Public Information and Warning

4. Public Information Management - Assess the capability and adequacy of the City's ability to initiate information gathering for an initial press release, with the approval of EOC Management.

- A. Initiate information gathering for a press release, with the approval of EOC Management.
- B. Develop messaging for the public that details specific incident information and also includes information on: Evacuation, Reception, and Mass Care & Feeding.
- C. Monitor and push approved information through social media,

III. EXERCISE FINDINGS

The primary purpose of the 2012 City of Los Angeles EOC Functional Exercise was to assess the EOC Training conducted to date within the City of Los Angeles (EOC-101/201/301 Training Courses) and to confirm that the specific tasks required to ensure the development of the EOC Coordination Plan were accomplished in a timely manner.

During the exercise, information gathering and exercise effectiveness were enhanced by the expanded use of simulated media reports. Use of these exercise tools increased incident information gathering capabilities and improved timely decision-making.

The evaluation process was focused primarily on the demonstration of specific tasks related to the development of the EOC Coordination Process, through the actions of the EOC Directors, as well as those of the Section Coordinators, Branch Directors and selected Unit Leaders.

Each individual EOC Section was evaluated based upon the specific responsibilities of that Section in the coordination process and each Section's development of the Coordination Plan, which is the key to operational success in the City of Los Angeles EOC. Evaluation criteria were designed specific to each EOC Section, with identified actions, determined primarily from the EOC-301 Training Course. Completed evaluation forms are included in this After-Action Report as **Attachments A through D**.

A. Practices to Sustain

The following bulleted list represents practices that EOC Evaluators, Controllers, and Participants noted as best-practices to sustain:

- EMD staff provided significant support for EOC responders not familiar with the EOC. EMD coached responders through their roles to ensure that the established EOC processes were put into effect.
- Evaluators felt that all EOC responders worked well within their assigned roles, which assisted in moving the EOC process forward. EOC responders were very receptive and engaged. Noticeable improvements in responders' knowledge level were due primarily to responders past attendance of EOC training.
- The check-in process improved with crowd control being managed much more effectively. The revised WebEOC system made the check-in process easier and more efficient.
- The EOC Directors worked well together. The Directors indicated that the EOC process works well and effectively ties in all EOC activities.
- The Planning Section and Situation Analysis Unit were focused on ensuring the proper collection, analysis, and dissemination of incident information. The EOC Coordination process allowed Management to address issues that were presented to them.
- The Public Information component within the Management Section worked well with team members due to previous familiarity from working with one another in previous incidents. Public Information Officers (PIOs) were very familiar with today's social media and its capabilities. PIOs were capable in providing information, briefing notes, press conference locations, times, and facilitating a coordinated public information strategy.
- Business Operating Center (BOC) leadership stated that the Exercise allowed a higher level of interaction within their own team and gave the BOC an opportunity to interact with other EOC Sections during a simulated incident requiring information exchange. Attendees noted that recent WebEOC training helped the BOC facilitate their internal processes. There was active participation from a number of private sector partners in the BOC portion of the Functional Exercise.
- In the Planning Section, the teamwork among multiple agencies was repeatedly noted. The willingness to work together, communicate with each other, and communicate with other Sections was noted as a culture to be encouraged and emulated during future activations.

- The Operations Section commented on the collaboration that occurred among the different agencies and the commitment of the personnel assigned to do an effective job.
- Both Law and Fire representatives in the Operations Section commented on the fact that the exercise gave both organizations continued opportunities to develop the coordination process between their DOCs and the EOC when activated. For LAPD, this allowed the RACR DOC Unit Leader, working with their DOC, to apply lessons learned from the 2012 EOC Functional Exercise and to successfully continue the coordination activities conducted to date. For LAFD, the exercise gave their department a rare opportunity to actually open and exercise the LAFD DOC. Allowing personnel to become more familiar with the available tools and technology positively impacted team synergy.
- The Logistics Section noted the quality of the staff assigned and the effective team work that resulted.
- Finance and Administration Section personnel indicated that the on-the-job training provided at their POD during the exercise was very effective. Objectives for the Section were clear and the Access Assistance system worked well.
- The Logistics Section noted that the EOC Trainings proved to be essential to understanding the established process. Additionally, having the Exercise Controller available assisted in 'connecting' the process. The City Attorney was well prepared.
- Within the Logistics Section, all members used ICS Field forms (ICS-214; also known as 'Duty Log' forms) and WebEOC to track requests and actions taken to fill those requests, ensuring redundancy of documentation. A scribe gathered ICS-214 (Duty Log) forms from all members within the Section, and consolidated the information into one form to track movement of resources for the Section as a whole.
- Overall, the Logistics Branch was successful during the Exercise. As staff worked through their initial confusion, they were able to take on incoming requests. The Section Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator eventually shared critical incident information with the entire Section, facilitating request management. The Section as a whole responded well. By the end of the exercise, the Section was handling requests quickly. Progress was tracked by looking at staff ICS- 214 (Duty Log) forms to see whether requests were followed up on and to confirm that supplies were moving to where they needed to go.

B. Areas Requiring Improvement

The following bulleted list represents opportunities for improvement that EOC Evaluators observed and felt should be documented:

- More direct interaction and involvement from the EOC Directors were noted as necessary in the implementation of the EOC Standing Objectives and in the confirmation of which Sections are responsible for carrying out each objective's requirements. Immediate implementation and attainment of the objectives were impacted by this lack of direct involvement.
- As Exercise activity began, the Planning Section Chief (PSC) and Situation Analysis Unit Leader (SAUL) attempted to conduct their initial meeting with EOC Management. The EOC Deputy Director (from EMD) then questioned them as to why the EOC had been activated to Level 3. The initial planning process is designed primarily to focus on proposing and confirming the EOC Coordination Process' intent, schedule, and deliverables with the EOC Director and Deputy Directors. However, the initial planning process was delayed while discussion of the issue took place.
- The objectives ultimately proposed by Planning Section for approval by the EOC Director and Deputy Directors were not evaluated or subjected to the SMART objectives process. They were not considered strong objectives for assignment to the main floor.
- Alert LA County was not specifically identified or utilized as a resource for mass notification to the areas affected by the incident. Though the need for mass notification was considered, staff were not assigned to make use of this capability.
- Situational Awareness for EOC Management faced recurring problems based upon the isolation of Management from the main floor. Developed primarily from updates from the main floor, this physical separation limited effectiveness, increased information delays, and increased the time needed to set EOC objectives. There was a disparity between the information that the Management Section was working off of and the information the rest of the EOC was working from. The net result was that the EOC Director and Deputy Directors were working without complete information.
- The EOC Coordinator was not involved in leading the Coordination process inside the Management Room. Also, there was still some duplication within specific checklists (EM Coordinator, Plans Chief, Management Support to EMD EOC Deputy Director) as to who has functional responsibility for ensuring that the *entire* EOC Coordination Process, not just the Planning activities, are performing as expected.

- The role, function, and responsibility of creating the Report on Current Conditions (ROCC) needs further discussion and development. During this Exercise, creating the ROCC was assigned first to the EOC Coordinator and then to the EOC Deputy Director (EMD) Management Staff Support. This ROCC form has not been established in EOC process documentation as a tool during Level III EOC activations. It has only been demonstrated during Level I and II EOC activations. The document needs to be re-evaluated to determine its usefulness during a Level III EOC Coordination Process.
- Within the Management Section, the Lead PIO (from the Lead Agency) was unavailable to participate at the last minute. The Lead department sent a replacement with little or no PIO experience, requiring the EMD Assistant PIO to take over the Lead PIO role. This demonstrated the need to ensure that only individuals who have been trained and understand the unique EOC-specific activities of the PIO process should be assigned duties as the Lead PIO.
- The revised WebEOC boards were thought to be easier to use than previous versions, but more training is needed. Pushing information out to ensure other Sections or DOCs supported the creation of a Common Operating Picture. However, pulling information from those same sources and determining specifically what information is needed, based upon incident specifics, requires more planning and training.
- The Logistics Section Coordinator and Deputy were Fire Department-centric in their EOC approach and were initially unaware of specific EOC responsibilities. Upon entering the EOC, both initially went to the Fire Branch within the Operations Section. The Evaluator for the Section had to make contact with these individuals and direct them back to their correct Logistics assignments.
- Logistics Section leadership appeared unaware of how the EOC functions, the processes established through the EOC "P" Planning model, or the purpose and utilization of the Planning model. Many times during the Exercise the Section Coordinator and Deputy were told by Units within the Section that they were not following established EOC procedures and needed to go through the formal request process, utilizing the correct forms. By the end of the exercise, resource requests were being completed, though the process was modified down to simply walking up and requesting a resource without following any of the designated approval processes. No established process was followed to request equipment or personnel. Section personnel were unaware of how to access EOC forms or where they could be located. Exercise

Evaluators prompted staff to check the correct computer drive to find the required forms.

- Internal non-Fire Department specific resources were identified within the Logistics Section, but leadership within the Section chose to utilize the Operations Section's Fire Branch as their sole source for fulfilling those requests, without checking within the Logistics Section first.
- Logistics Section personnel had little opportunity to interact and follow through with the Resource Request process during the Exercise. All requests coming into the Logistics Section were assigned to the Deputy, who functioned as a runner and went only to the Fire Branch within the Operations Section for the Logistics Section's needs. Communication within the Logistics Section was established solely between the Section Coordinator, the Deputy, and the Operations Section's Fire Branch. Only when an Evaluator encouraged Logistics Section leadership to look within the Section to find resources did effective communications begin within the Logistics Section.
- The Logistics Section experienced technology challenges for the first 30-45 minutes. This directly impacted the Section's effectiveness. Without inter-Sectional communications occurring for the first 90 minutes, the Section Coordinator, the Deputy, and the identified "Shadow" Deputy communicated primarily between themselves. These positions were all staffed by personnel from the same City public safety agency.
- Though a "Shadow Deputy" worked in this Section providing assistance with resource tracking, as well as scribing, this individual was often a hindrance. Their presence limited the Coordinator and Deputy's supervisory engagement within their assigned Logistics Section. This "Shadow Deputy" initiated some successful procedures, but these procedures were not in line with the established EOC Planning "P" Model and its procedures, thus causing further confusion within the Section.
- Logistics Section Staff were eager to learn how to function in their roles and how to use all tools presently available to the Section. But without strong direction and interaction with Section Management, they were hindered in their ability to respond effectively.
- Actions taken by the Logistics Section Coordinator and Deputy, the Operations Section's Fire Branch, and the LAFD DOC left a consistent and repeated impression that these groups were each attempting to tactically control operations in a fire-fighting manner.
- The Operations Section Coordinator was completely unfamiliar with EOC responsibilities. Within the Section, some staff members did not use their Position Binders or Position Checklists and were

unaware that this job assistance information was available. Some staff did not use their ICS-214 (Duty Log) until advised.

- Personnel within the Operations Section indicated that they did not have a formal EOC assignment, but were there to assist staff, specifically within the Fire and Mass Care Branches.
- Within the Operations Section, routing messages and information was difficult. Information received by the Fire Branch from the Law Branch Director about an injured firefighter was not passed on despite the assigned Exercise Controller's suggestions to do so. This seemed to be due to the unfamiliarity and inexperience of the assigned EOC staff.
- Both the Section Coordinator and Deputy were absent from the Operations Section for long periods, while attending Management and Section meetings. (Per Deputy Coordinator responsibilities, they are the designated lead for the Section in the absence of the Coordinator.) No one in the Section was advised to provide leadership. During Section Briefing meetings away from the main floor, no one was designated by the Branch Director as the lead for the Utilities, Mass Care or Law Branches.
- Within the Mass Care Branch, Unit Leader position checklists were missing from the Positions Binders for the Red Cross Unit, LAUSD Unit, and Disabled Unit.
- Despite the information provided during the in-coming briefing, the Mass Care Branch initially had no information on the location of opened shelters. Additionally, the Mass Care Plan initially did not have the approval of all Units within the Mass Care Branch, as required.
- After either of the Management meetings, in the Operations Section, staff were not informed by the Section Coordinator of objectives.
- Within the Finance and Administration Section, the lack of any pre-identified and pre-established requirements, procedures, and process information impacted their ability to participate in the Exercise. This lack of information does not adequately prepare other Sections to understand and operate under defined financial limits and requirements when the EOC is supporting actual incidents.

C. Additional Comments

Management Section

- The EOC Directors felt that EOC guides and reference books would assist Management to carry out the EOC Coordination process.
- Conflicting information was a consistent problem. More specific training and exposure on how to effectively deal with confusing or conflicting information was also requested.
- BOC leadership indicated the continuing need for more process development and training for BOC personnel and the need for cleaner lines of communications, both within the BOC, and between the BOC and the EOC, in order to increase understanding of the BOC's overall capabilities and constraints.
- More focus is needed on specific process tasks to make the Management process more effective.
- Different levels of training and experience created gaps in understanding, making it challenging for some to keep up.
- The isolation of Management from the EOC main floor was problematic, with two different realities occurring: one in the main floor room and another in the management room.

Planning

- The revised WebEOC was much more useful than previous versions, but further development, along with more training, is critically needed.

Operations

- Additional staff is needed within the Section, specifically as scribes for the Coordinator and Deputy.
- The Fire DOC attempted to handle the tactical incident as if they were the single controlling and coordinating entity, without sharing critical information horizontally and vertically, throughout the City's established incident coordinating organizations. Re-establishing that missing connection was a challenge. Improvement is possible with greater understanding and familiarity of individual roles and missions within their DOC.
- Often, with leadership missing, others would stand up and assume the leadership responsibility for the Section.

- Personnel did not know where information should go. This caused confusion and slowed the EOC Coordination process down.
- The Section Coordinator did not make sure to understand the specific objectives assigned. He also did not know what was going on in the Planning and Coordination meetings, or what his responsibilities were during the meetings.
- The Deputy Coordinator clearly understood primary responsibilities, but consistently needed to spend time bringing the Director up to speed. This pulled the Deputy from those responsibilities.
- Getting staff logged-onto the computers took longer than necessary. The delays impacted effective and timely coordination.
- There were concerns expressed about a tendency for individuals to fall back upon their tactical command experience, instead of focusing on their coordination and collaboration responsibilities.
- The Section Coordinator delegated too many Sectional responsibilities to the Law Branch Director. This caused concerns within the Section.
- A lack of WebEOC familiarity by the Fire DOC caused problems with the timely and accurate sharing of incident information.
- Mass Care expressed their unfamiliarity with several key EOC process forms, directly impacting their planning ability.
- Technology failures impacted the timely creation of incident mapping. This challenge opened up opportunities to identify alternatives.

IV. CONCLUSION

The 2012 City of Los Angeles EOC Functional Exercise provided an opportunity to validate and reaffirm the City's EOC processes and procedures, and to measure the operational capability and readiness of EOC responders, based upon the training received.

Overall, the exercise capabilities and objectives identified for this exercise were achieved.

Operational Coordination - Effective EOC Management was demonstrated, though information flow and the vetting process were hurdles. The Coordination process worked, with a Situational Awareness process eventually being established and a Common Operating Picture of the incident being shared both within the EOC and the DOCs. The preparation activities necessary to conduct both the Coordination and Planning meetings were also effective.

Operational Communications - Both inter- and intra- EOC communications were established, though the multi-disciplinary communications necessary between the EOC and activated DOCs require further development. The documented process for ensuring communications flow between the DOCs and EOCs, and the impact on decision-making, was also demonstrated, though not always in the most coordinated manner or through the use of established best-practices.

Mass Care Services - Based upon incident specifics, the Mass Care Branch developed a Mass Reception and Shelter Plan for the affected population, though the need for universal approval by all Units within the Mass Care Branch, before the plan could go to the EOC Directors for review and approval, needed to be reinforced.

Public Information and Warning - Even without the designated and experienced Lead PIO from the Lead Agency, the EMD PIO and their Assistant PIOs effectively demonstrated the City's ability to monitor social media; respond to and correct inaccurate information; gather information from participating, assisting, and cooperating agencies; develop public messaging related specifically to the incident, and to specifically include evacuation, reception, mass care and feeding information; and prepare an initial press release for approval by the EOC Directors.

Insufficient training and knowledge of the established processes and procedures were again noted as a key contributor of EOC confusion in this Exercise. That being noted, many more EOC Responders than in previous Exercises had received EOC training and made good use of this acquired knowledge and, more importantly, used that acquired experience to carry out their EOC responsibilities. As an example, the disparity noted in both training and experience between the

EOC Director (LAFD) and the Deputy EOC Director (LAPD) demonstrated the need to ensure that as many potential EOC Directors and Deputy Directors be trained as possible. Anyone that could be placed in important EOC roles such as an EOC Director or Deputy Director, must have as much exposure as possible to their EOC responsibilities beforehand. The continuing refinement and understanding of EOC processes and procedures should be a key priority.

The continuing unfamiliarity with WebEOC was again documented by both Evaluators and EOC Responders. This impacted both the information gathering and sharing processes. Though the WebEOC boards had been revised and updated, and training had been made available to EOC responders at the Section Chief and Branch levels, low turn-out for these awareness-level training sessions prevented the effectiveness of WebEOC as an information sharing tool.

Exercise Evaluators again noted the need and participant requests for scribes to document the key actions taken by Section Coordinators and their Deputies, especially during the initial phase of the EOC activation. It is during the initial phase of the Coordination cycle when task saturation tends to prevent staff from adequately documenting individual actions taken, as well as the overall actions and information gathered by the Sections. When these crucial documentation actions are relegated to a lower priority, the net effect is often that key information is lost and key actions are not taken.

Continued development of established EOC Coordination processes, the EOC Training Series, as well as the planned development of Section-Specific Training will ensure that the EOC will function effectively when activated for a no-notice incident, because it will be staffed by trained, focused, EOC Responders who understand their roles and responsibilities and what is necessary to ensure the safety and security of the City of Los Angeles.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation of this EOC Functional Exercise provided the opportunity to observe specific EOC tasks and activities and then recommendations to improve what was demonstrated. Below are several key overarching recommendations that will enhance the performance of EOC personnel, as well as important EOC processes and procedures:

1. More relevant forms of training, including process drills, are critical. These trainings and drills should be developed not just for those working at the Unit or Branch Level, but also for those individuals assigned to key Management positions. The lack of regular and follow-on training, and relevant experience working within an EOC, was again demonstrated to

- be a major contributor to EOC Coordination process confusion for many EOC Responders.
2. Better communications between all EOC functions is needed. Communications between the Logistics Coordinator and Deputy needs to be improved.
 3. Information flow, especially the need to push priority life safety information to the top of the EOC organization for action, should be expressed as a priority requirement coming directly from the EOC Director.
 4. More Overall EOC and Section training, as well as process drills, is needed for EOC Responders to fully develop the various team structures and concepts necessary for effective operations. Exercise participants must look at the Position Binders that describe their roles and responsibilities immediately after they check into the EOC and report to their Section Coordinator, and throughout the Exercise or incident, as needed. EOC training, again, has proven to be an extremely important piece for understanding and facilitating the EOC Coordination process.
 5. Ensure that all Section Coordinators pull their Sections together and conduct initial introductions, set expectations, and then disseminate information coming down from the EOC Management staff, such as EOC incident objectives and priorities.
 6. Ensure that all Section Coordinators assign their Deputies to remain within their Section when the Coordinator is away from the immediate area.
 7. A major effort should be made to get all potential EOC Responders to participate in the updated WebEOC Training.
 8. Scribes should be designated to track and document Section activities that take place during the Operational Period. Formal procedures for using Runners should be developed to free up personnel to do face-to-face coordination, when necessary.
 9. Ground rules for the use of 'Shadow' positions be in place before an exercise or a real event occurs.
 10. The City Department-assigned Lead responsibility for the Finance and Administration Section function within the EOC should assist the City's Emergency Management Department (EMD) in developing documented processes and training material on emergency financial procedures, requirements, and limitations, *before* a major event occurs. This information can be used by other EOC Sections immediately upon their activation. This pre-incident information could assist in preventing potentially incorrect or inaccurate financial transactions from occurring and negatively impacting the City's overall response to a major emergency.