


## TRANSMITTAL

TO The Council	DATE 09/01/16	COUNCIL FILE NO.
FROM The Mayor	COUNCIL DISTRICT ALL	

On November 19, 2015, the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated as part of a city-wide Functional Exercise (FE). This exercise was conducted in concert with a broader regional public health exercise focused on Medical Countermeasures (MCM) distribution and dispensing as a result of a biological attack. The City EOC communicated and coordinated with other organizations and EOCs throughout the region, particularly the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health Department Operations Center (DOC) and the Los Angeles County Operational Area EOC. The attached AAR/IP provides a summary of the activation, identifies involved departments and agencies, and details the recommendations for future activations of the EOC. This Emergency Operations Board approved the attached City of Los Angeles 2015 Functional Exercise After Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) it's July 19, 2016.

  
Eric Garcetti  
Mayor

(Ana Guerrero)

CITY OF LOS ANGELES  
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

Date: August 16, 2016

To: Eric Garcetti, Mayor

From: Anna Burton, Executive Assistant  
Emergency Operations Board

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Anna Burton". The signature is written in a cursive style and is positioned to the right of the typed name and title.

Subject: **CITY OF LOS ANGELES 2015 FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE AFTER  
ACTION REPORT/IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

At its July 19, 2016, meeting, the Emergency Operations Board approved the attached City of Los Angeles 2015 Functional Exercise After Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) and recommended it be forwarded to the Mayor for approval and forwarding to the City Council.

Executive Summary

On November 19, 2015, the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated as part of a city-wide Functional Exercise (FE). This exercise was conducted in concert with a broader regional public health exercise focused on Medical Countermeasures (MCM) distribution and dispensing as a result of a biological attack. The City EOC communicated and coordinated with other organizations and EOCs throughout the region, particularly the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health Department Operations Center (DOC) and the Los Angeles County Operational Area EOC.

The attached AAR/IP provides a summary of the activation, identifies involved departments and agencies, and details the recommendations for future activations of the EOC.

With your approval this report should be forwarded to the City Council with the attached transmittal for its information and file.

Attachment – City of Los Angeles 2015 Functional Exercise After Action Report/Improvement Plan

cc: Jeff Gorell, Deputy Mayor, Mayor's Office of Public Safety


CITY OF LOS ANGELES  
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE



Date: July 12, 2016

To: Charlie Beck, Chair  
Emergency Operations Board

Emergency Operations Board Members

From: Anna Burton, Executive Assistant  
Emergency Operations Board 

Subject: **CITY OF LOS ANGELES 2015 FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE  
AFTER ACTION REPORT/IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

Recommendation

That the Emergency Operations Board, as recommended by the Emergency Management Committee (EMC), approve the attached City of Los Angeles 2015 Functional Exercise After Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) and forward to the Mayor for transmittal to the City Council.

Summary

On November 19, 2015, the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated as part of a city-wide Functional Exercise (FE). This exercise was planned for eight (8) hours with a primary focus on the City's EOC processes, information sharing and regional coordination capabilities. This exercise was conducted in concert with a broader regional public health exercise focused on Medical Countermeasures (MCM) distribution and dispensing as a result of a biological attack. As such, the City EOC communicated and coordinated with other organizations and operations centers throughout the region that were also participating; particularly the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health Department Operations Center (DOC) and the Los Angeles County Operational Area EOC.

Many City departments activated their Department Operations Center (DOC) or Bureau Operations Center (BOC) to coordinate and communicate with the City EOC. All impacts of the scenario, an anthrax attack in southern California, were simulated; however, EOC and DOC responders were required to perform their emergency responsibilities, including continuity of operations plan execution, as if the incident were real.

The attached AAR/IP provides a summary of the activation, identifies involved departments and agencies, and details the recommendations for future activations of the EOC. This report was approved by the EMC at its April 6, 2016, meeting. With approval by the EOB, EMD will forward to the Mayor for approval and transmittal to the City Council.

EMD will track areas recommended for improvement and, as appropriate, report back through the Emergency Operations Organization.

Attachment

**CITY OF LOS ANGELES**  
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE



Date: March 29, 2016

To: Anna Burton, Emergency Management Committee Chair  
Emergency Management Committee Members

From: Rob Freeman, Operations Division Chief  
Emergency Management Department

Subject: **CITY OF LOS ANGELES 2015 FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE  
AFTER ACTION REPORT/IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

Recommendation

That the Emergency Management Committee (EMC) approve the attached City of Los Angeles 2015 Functional Exercise After Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) and forward to the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) for approval.

Summary

On November 19, 2015, the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated as part of a city-wide Functional Exercise (FE). This exercise was planned for eight (8) hours with a primary focus on the City's EOC processes, information sharing and regional coordination capabilities. This exercise was conducted in concert with a broader regional public health exercise focused on Medical Countermeasures (MCM) distribution and dispensing as a result of a biological attack. As such, the City EOC communicated and coordinated with other organizations and operations centers throughout the region that were also participating; particularly the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health Department Operations Center (DOC) and the Los Angeles County Operational Area EOC.

Many City departments activated their Department Operations Center (DOC) or Bureau Operations Center (BOC) to coordinate and communicate with the City EOC. All impacts of the scenario, an anthrax attack in southern California, were simulated; however, EOC and DOC responders were required to perform their emergency responsibilities, including continuity of operations plan execution, as if the incident were real.

The attached report provides a summary of the activation, identifies involved departments and agencies, and details the recommendations for future activations of the EOC. EMD will track areas recommended for improvement and, as appropriate, report back through the Emergency Management Committee and Emergency Operations Board.

Attachment – City of Los Angeles 2015 Functional Exercise After Action Report/Improvement Plan



# City of Los Angeles 2015 Functional Exercise

November 19, 2015

After-Action Report/Improvement Plan

Publication Date: February 16, 2016



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## EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Exercise Name	<b>City of Los Angeles 2015 Functional Exercise</b>
Sponsor	City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department (EMD)
Exercise Dates/ Times	<p>Thursday, November 19, 2015</p> <p>Start of Exercise (StartEx): 8:00 a.m.</p> <p>End of Exercise (EndEx): 4:00 p.m.</p>
Scope	<p>This exercise was a city-wide Functional Exercise (FE) planned for eight (8) hours with a primary focus on the City Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 500 E. Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012. Many City Departments activated their respective Department Operations Centers (DOCs) at various locations throughout the City to coordinate and communicate with the City EOC during the exercise. Exercise play included EOC and DOC responders and liaisons from respective stakeholder groups and partner agencies that reported to the EOC or appropriate DOCs (e.g., Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs], private industry, neighboring jurisdictions). This exercise was conducted in concert with a broader regional public health exercise focused on Medical Countermeasures (MCM) distribution and dispensing as a result of a biological terrorist attack. As such, the City EOC communicated and coordinated with other organizations and operations centers throughout the region that were also participating; particularly the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health DOC. As a functional exercise, the event did not include the actual mobilization of resources to simulated incident locations. While all impacts of the scenario were notional; EOC and DOC responders were expected to perform their emergency responsibilities in accordance with plans and procedures as if the incident were real.</p>
Mission Area	Response
Core Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational Coordination</li> <li>• Operational Communications</li> <li>• Situational Assessment</li> <li>• Planning</li> <li>• Public and Private Services and Resources</li> <li>• Public Health and Medical Services</li> <li>• Public Information and Warning</li> </ul>

## Objectives

- Demonstrate an effective Level 3 “Alpha” Activation of the City EOC appropriate and proportionate for the public health emergency and medical countermeasures response anticipated.
- Rehearse the EOC’s documented planning/coordination process for the “managed phase” of a public health emergency.
- In coordination with City DOCs and partner agencies, evaluate the City EOC’s ability to collect, prioritize, document, maintain, and disseminate situational awareness and a common operating picture regarding the City’s medical countermeasures response and the community-wide impacts of a public health emergency.
- Evaluate the ability of the City of Los Angeles to communicate with the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health (DPH) DOC to coordinate (including the integration of a Public Health Technical Specialist in the EOC Planning and Intelligence Section) and implement an effective medical countermeasures (MCM) response during a public health emergency; specifically, the dispensing of mass prophylaxis at eighty-nine (89) Points of Dispensing (PODs) in the City of Los Angeles.
- Evaluate the ability of the City of Los Angeles to coordinate, request resources, and share and receive situational information with the Operational Area EOC through a County of Los Angeles Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Agency Representative in the City EOC.
- Demonstrate an EOC resource management capability that facilitates the identification of resource needs, prioritization of competing requests, acquisition of appropriate resources, effective mobilization and tracking, and involves effective communications among relevant stakeholders throughout the process.
- Proclaim a Local Emergency and establish appropriate jurisdiction-wide priorities, strategies, policies, ordinances, rules, and regulations to address the current and foreseeable complexities of a public health emergency and to support or enhance mitigation and response measures.
- Implement an effective and customized emergency public information campaign that addresses the medical countermeasures response, mitigates community-wide impacts of a public health emergency, and solicits the input of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and other relevant partners.
- Demonstrate the ability of City DOCs to coordinate information, resources, and response priorities to address the impacts of a public health emergency on their specific department’s operations and in accordance with directives from the City EOC.
- Evaluate the ability of City of Los Angeles departments and agencies to select and implement appropriate continuity strategies as a result of personnel absenteeism rates between 30% - 50%.
- Effectively demonstrate the activation of the Disaster Service Worker (DSW) program across all city departments/agencies; and have each

	<p>department support the mobilization of one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel per twelve (12)-hour shift in accordance with the “Activation of the Disaster Service Worker Program Standard Operating Procedure” (dated 10/10/2014).</p>
<p>Threat or Hazard</p>	<p>Biological Terrorist Attack (Anthrax)/Public Health Emergency</p>
<p>Scenario Synopsis</p>	<p>Approximately thirteen (13) hours before the start of the exercise, BioWatch Actionable Results (BARs) confirmed the presence of anthrax throughout Los Angeles County and Southern California. In addition, epidemiological reporting linked a number of people arriving at hospitals to potential anthrax symptoms. Based on intelligence received from law enforcement and through the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC), a correlation was made between the BAR detections and the plans of a terrorist organization to disperse dry anthrax spores (similar to the weapons-grade Ames strain) over Southern California using multiple aircraft. Due to anthrax’s extreme virulence and the widespread exposure, the Los Angeles County Public Health Officer, in coordination with Public Health Officers from across Southern California and the California Department of Public Health, declared health emergencies and requested medical countermeasures through the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) in accordance with the Medical Countermeasures Plan for the Los Angeles County Operational Area (Annex 6 of the Los Angeles County Operational Area [LACOA] All-Hazards Emergency Response Plan [ERP]). In accordance with the plan, the population of Los Angeles County (approximately ten [10] million people) had to be provided prophylactic medications within forty-eight (48) hours of the decision to activate the SNS.</p> <p>At the start of the exercise, medical and logistical supplies had arrived at all eighty-nine (89) Points of Dispensing (PODs) sites in the City of Los Angeles (simulated) and PODs were scheduled to open to the public within two (2) hours of the start of exercise (10:00 hours). Over the course of the exercise many challenges to medication distribution efforts at PODs were addressed: traffic management, infrastructure outages, illicit activity, organized protests, staffing and resource shortages, public inquiry and messaging, animal illnesses and concerns, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and hospital surge, worried well, secondary contamination, etc.</p>
<p>Participating Organizations</p>	<p>The government of the City of Los Angeles is comprised of an Executive (the Mayor), City Council, and forty-three (43) City Departments and Bureaus. Collectively, these agencies comprise the City’s Emergency Operations Organization (EOO), a “department without walls,” responsible for the City’s emergency preparations (planning, training, exercising, and mitigation), response, and recovery operations. Each member of the EOO was invited to participate in the 2015 Citywide Functional Exercise by either</p>

activating its respective DOC or deploying staff to the City EOC as appropriate. In addition, relevant stakeholders and emergency partners were invited to rehearse their respective roles in the City EOC in accordance with agreements and procedures (e.g., NGOs, private sector).

During the exercise, the City EOC was activated to a Level 3 (Full Activation) Alpha (Fire Department Lead) with approximately 100 EOC responders.

Eleven (11) DOCs and/or Bureau Operations Centers (BOCs) were also activated for the exercise, with each having various staffing levels depending on its individual protocols and objectives.

As previously stated, this exercise was conducted in concert with a broader regional public health exercise that included dozens of other response organizations at local, county, State, and Federal levels. This After-Action Report only addresses the participation of City of Los Angeles agencies.

*The full list of participating City of Los Angeles agencies/organizations is included in Appendix B.*

**Points of  
Contact**

City of Los Angeles:

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Partner/Chief Operating Officer  
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Burbank, CA 91504  
(626) 320-0218 Office  
[NLowe@CPARSconsulting.com](mailto:NLowe@CPARSconsulting.com)

## ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVES AND CORE CAPABILITIES

Aligning objectives and core capabilities for evaluation purposes transcends individual exercises to support ongoing and consistent preparedness reporting and trend analysis. Table 1 below includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and a summary performance rating for each objective as determined by the evaluation team. The following sections then provide an overview of performance to justify the summary rating, highlighting strengths and areas for improvement.

**Table 1. Summary of Objective and Capability Performance**

(P – Performed Without Challenge, S – Performed with Some Challenge, M – Performed with Major Challenge, U – Unable to Perform)

Objective	Core Capability	Summary Rating			
		P	S	M	U
Demonstrate an effective Level 3 “Alpha” Activation of the City EOC appropriate and proportionate for the public health emergency and medical countermeasures response anticipated.	Operational Coordination Public Health and Medical Services		S		
Rehearse the EOC’s documented planning/coordination process for the “managed phase” of a public health emergency.	Operational Coordination Planning Situational Assessment Public Health and Medical Services		S		
In coordination with City DOCs and partner agencies, evaluate the City EOC’s ability to collect, prioritize, document, maintain, and disseminate situational awareness and a common operating picture regarding the City’s medical countermeasures response and the community-wide impacts of a public health emergency.	Situational Assessment Public Health and Medical Services			M	
Evaluate the ability of the City of Los Angeles to communicate with the Los Angeles County DPH DOC to coordinate (including the integration of a Public Health Technical Specialist in the EOC Planning and Intelligence Section) and implement an effective MCM response during a public health emergency; specifically, the dispensing of mass prophylaxis at eighty-nine (89) PODs in the City of Los Angeles.	Operational Communications Operational Coordination Situational Assessment Public Health and Medical Services			M	
Evaluate the ability of the City of Los Angeles to coordinate, request resources, and share and receive situational information with the Operational Area EOC through a County of Los Angeles OEM Agency Representative in the City EOC.	Operational Coordination Public and Private Services and Resources Situational Assessment			M	
Demonstrate an EOC resource management capability that facilitates the identification of resource needs, prioritization of competing requests, acquisition of appropriate resources, effective mobilization and tracking, and involves effective communications among relevant stakeholders throughout the process.	Operational Coordination Public and Private Services and Resources		S		
Proclaim a Local Emergency and establish appropriate jurisdiction-wide priorities, strategies, policies,	Planning	P			

Objective	Core Capability	Summary Rating			
		P	S	M	U
ordinances, rules, and regulations to address the current and foreseeable complexities of a public health emergency and to support or enhance mitigation and response measures.	Operational Coordination				
Implement an effective and customized emergency public information campaign that addresses the medical countermeasures response, mitigates community-wide impacts of a public health emergency, and solicits the input of the Los Angeles County DPH and other relevant partners.	Public Information and Warning			M	
Demonstrate the ability of City DOCs to coordinate information, resources, and response priorities to address the impacts of a public health emergency on their specific department's operations and in accordance with directives from the City EOC.	Operational Coordination Planning Situational Assessment Public and Private Services and Resources			M	
Evaluate the ability of City of Los Angeles departments and agencies to select and implement appropriate continuity strategies as a result of personnel absenteeism rates between 30% - 50%.	Planning			M	
Effectively demonstrate the activation of the Disaster Service Worker (DSW) program across all city departments/ agencies; and have each department support the mobilization of one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel per twelve (12)-hour shift in accordance with the "Activation of the Disaster Service Worker Program Standard Operating Procedure" (dated 10/10/2014).	Operational Coordination Planning Public and Private Services and Resources		S		

**Ratings Definitions:**

- 1. Performed without Challenges (P):** The critical tasks associated with the objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.
- 2. Performed with Some Challenges (S):** The critical tasks associated with the objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. However, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified.
- 3. Performed with Major Challenges (M):** The critical tasks associated with the objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s), but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.
- 4. Unable to be Performed (U):** The critical tasks associated with the objective were not performed in a manner that achieved the objective(s).

**Objective 1:** Demonstrate an effective Level 3 “Alpha” Activation of the City EOC appropriate and proportionate for the public health emergency and medical countermeasures response anticipated.

The critical tasks associated with this objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective; however, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, but in some cases it was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with this objective are described in this section.

### Strengths

The following strengths related to this objective were demonstrated during the exercise and contributed to the objective being met:

**Strength 1.1:** The value of the Emergency Management Department’s (EMD’s) personnel in key leadership and supporting roles continued to be evident during this exercise. Of particular note, EOC personnel acknowledged the value of the EOC Coordinator and Deputy EOC Coordinator in helping to clarify processes and responsibilities, and as catalysts for actions needing to be taken. Likewise, the entire staff of the “Emergency Management Pod” was recognized for providing immediate technical assistance with WebEOC and other EOC systems/displays. EOC personnel also noted the value of the EMD EOC Deputy Director, Operations Section Deputy Coordinator, Liaison Officer (related to Agency Representatives), and EMD Assistant Public Information Officer (PIO), in serving as EOC subject-matter experts and providing advice and guidance throughout the exercise.

**Strength 1.2:** The addition of appropriate technical specialists (including representatives from the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and the City of Los Angeles Department on Disability [regarding individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs]) dramatically increased the capabilities of the EOC and improved its resulting policies by complementing the City’s experience with additional relevant expertise. More importantly, these technical specialists were fully integrated into the EOC’s operations and decision-making, rather than being isolated to a specific area or task. Technical specialists may not have agreed with every decision made by the City, but their involvement at least ensured those decisions were fully informed.

**Strength 1.3:** The Liaison Officer did an excellent job of briefing Agency Representatives following every update he received and following coordination and planning meetings. The Liaison Officer’s briefings covered essential elements of information and ensured Agency Representatives maintained situational awareness (at least to the same degree of the Liaison Officer).

**Strength 1.4:** The Business Operations Center (BOC) employed an effective process for communicating relevant information to the BOC staff as well as making and tracking assignments. The BOC Director would diplomatically get BOC staff to listen, would then brief them on situation updates or incoming requests, and would then assign

responsibility to a suitable/available staff member. A dry/erase board was used to record the time and tracking number of each action, its requirements, the responsible position, and status updates over time. A spreadsheet was then generated to mirror the dry/erase board to memorialize the actions of the BOC.

**Strength 1.5:** The Department of Water and Power (DWP) staff assigned to the Utilities Branch came to the exercise with DWP laptops, which they used to directly access the three (3) DWP DOCs and real-time data on water and power systems.

## Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with this objective:

**Area for Improvement 1.1:** Selection of an EOC Director should be based on qualifications rather than discipline/department.

**Reference(s):** EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

**Analysis:** As a public health emergency, the scenario used for this exercise presented a unique situation that did not fit typical categories for classifying a disaster situation. At various points during the exercise and at post-exercise debriefings, participants questioned whether the lead should have been the Fire Department because of its medical/health responsibilities, the Police Department because the consequences of the emergency primarily resulted in crowd and traffic management/control issues, or the Emergency Management Department or another entity with a more “all hazards” focus. A very effective EOC Director was in place for the exercise; however, discussions of the alternatives concerned the evaluation team because each discussion focused on the EOC Director’s discipline rather than his/her capabilities. This is likely the result of an institutionalized culture that views the representatives from the Police and Fire Departments as the only qualified responders. The evaluation team collectively agreed an EOC Director should be selected based on capability over discipline/department. With appropriate subject-matter advisers, an EOC Director from any discipline/department can be successful so long as they have the appropriate understanding of EOC purpose and procedures, leadership skills, and associated capabilities. The City has a limited number of qualified EOC Directors and an extended emergency may tax those few resources, which will likely require qualified individuals to manage incidents not traditionally associated with their discipline/department.

**Area for Improvement 1.2:** Section Coordinators and Branch Directors tend to become involved in the individual tasks or minutiae assigned to their Sections/Branches at the cost of effective Section/Branch leadership and communications.

**Reference(s):** EMD EOC 301 Training (and future 400-level training courses)

Section Coordinator and Branch Director Position Checklists

EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

**Analysis:** During a full EOC activation it is the responsibility of the Section Coordinators and Branch Directors to delegate assignments to their Section’s/Branch’s staff and

transition their focus from individual tasks to management and leadership of the Section/Branch. During most of the City's past real-world EOC activations, which have all been a Level 1 or 2, the Section Coordinators and Branch Directors are responsible for fulfilling all the tasks of vacant units under them. As a result, they become accustomed to carrying out many of the individual tasks of the Section/Branch. In a Level 3 activation when the Section/Branch is fully staffed, the Section Coordinator/Branch Director should transition his/her focus from individual tasks to the management of the Section/Branch as a whole. This includes oversight of assignments, ensuring communications within and among Sections/Branches, monitoring adherence to procedures/policies/priorities, maintaining situational awareness, reassigning personnel and responsibilities as necessary, ensuring all necessary resources are being provided to Section/Branch staff, proactively establishing Section/Branch objectives, identifying shortfalls and areas of concern, conducting load balancing, and ensuring continuity of leadership (Section Coordinators, Branch Directors, and even the Management Section often left the EOC for extended durations without assigning an alternate to oversee operations in their absence). As observed during the exercise, all Section Coordinators and many Branch Directors struggled to some degree with these broader leadership responsibilities. As a result of leadership/management positions becoming sidetracked by minutiae, Sections and Branches failed to maintain situational awareness, tasks were delayed or not completed, and information was not communicated within or across Sections or Branches. This continues to be a perennial issue during the City's annual EOC exercises.

**Area for Improvement 1.3:** The role, composition, functionality, and coordination of Area (Bureau) Commands during widespread emergencies requires further development to achieve effective results.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Master Plan and Procedures  
EOC Policy and Procedures Manual  
Department-Specific Emergency Operations Plans

**Analysis:** This exercise was used as an opportunity to test a new multi-agency Area Command concept for supporting tactical operations during widespread emergencies in the City of Los Angeles. The concept is very familiar within the Police and Fire Departments; however, even those two departments have little experience with multi-agency Area Commands that may include representatives from nearly every City department with a response function. The concept is virtually unknown to the other departments of the City. Based on the magnitude of the scenario (89 PODs) and geographic distribution of POD operations, this event was seen as an excellent opportunity to test the multi-agency Area Command concept. The four Area Commands (Central, South, Valley, and West) were simulated as an exercise artificiality; however, there was still a significant lack of clarity within DOCs and at the EOC, regarding how the Area Commands would operate (including role, composition, and functionality) and with whom and how they would communicate/coordinate (i.e., via which DOCs, directly with EOC Management, etc.). Through the exercise, the multi-agency Area Command concept demonstrated clear potential; however, a concerted planning, concept familiarization, training and exercise program will need to be created to facilitate effective multi-agency Area Command involvement in future real-world incidents.

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**Objective 2:** Rehearse the EOC’s documented planning/coordination process for the “managed phase” of a public health emergency.

**Objective 3:** In coordination with City DOCs and partner agencies, evaluate the City EOC’s ability to collect, prioritize, document, maintain, and disseminate situational awareness and a common operating picture regarding the City’s medical countermeasures response and the community-wide impacts of a public health emergency.

Objectives Two (2) and Three (3) are closely related and interdependent. As such, the evaluations of the two (2) have been listed together in this section. The critical tasks associated with these objectives were completed in a manner that achieved the objectives, but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with these objectives are described in this section.

### Strengths

The following strengths related to these objectives were demonstrated during the exercise and contributed to the objectives being met:

**Strength 2/3.1:** Agendas, time limits, and intended outcomes were adhered to during the conduct and facilitation of EOC Coordination and Planning Meetings. With particular credit to the Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator and EOC Coordinator, the Coordination and Planning Meetings were effectively managed and facilitated and resulted in the desired outcomes in the time allotted.

**Strength 2/3.2:** The Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator, Deputy Section Coordinator, and Situation Analysis Unit Leader did an excellent job of following up with units throughout the EOC when clarity was needed regarding situation reports, additional information was needed, or critical information updates needed to be shared with EOC personnel. They promptly engaged relevant personnel in face-to-face communications to gather or share critical information.

**Strength 2/3.3:** Most Planning and Intelligence Section staff knew their jobs and performed them well (e.g., Situation Analysis Unit Leader, Documentation Unit Leader, Recovery Unit Leader), completing assignments quickly. The negative consequence of this was that they then often sat idle rather than being assigned by the Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator to support other functions in need of support (See Area for Improvement 1.2).

**Strength 2/3.4:** By the end of the exercise, the Planning and Intelligence Section produced an EOC Coordination Plan for the next Operational Period which included Incident Objectives (EOC Form 902), Organization List (EOC Form 903), Communications List (EOC Form 905 and attachments), Organization Chart (EOC Form

907), Incident Summary (EOC Form 909; albeit cumbersome – see area for improvement 2/3.2), and supporting documents (list and map of POD sites). This was not only accomplished in a compressed timeframe, but also after strategic response strategies were changed multiple times during the exercise to adapt to the changing situation.

**Strength 2/3.5:** Showing improvement from the 2014 Functional Exercise, EOC Sections did a better job of utilizing break-out rooms to facilitate coordination and planning within their Sections. Break-out rooms were significantly underutilized during the 2014 exercise; however, during this exercise, rooms were pre-assigned to Sections in need of them (e.g., Planning and Intelligence, Operations) and were frequently used for internal Section meetings and updates.

**Strength 2/3.6:** The Business Operations Center (BOC) did an excellent job of reaching out into the EOC to connect with the other EOC Sections. Through those engagements, the BOC made the EOC aware of the resources to which it may have access and shared with the EOC the status of its constituents and their needs and expectations to inform decision-making.

## Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with the objectives:

**Area for Improvement 2/3.1:** A lack of Section and Branch briefings to subordinates and insufficient information display/dissemination strategies resulted in a lack of awareness of critical information some EOC Sections had throughout the rest of the EOC (as appropriate).

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

EOC Coordination Process Forms and Procedures

EOC Branch/Section/Department Reports

EOC Display Plan

**Analysis:** 1) While situation updates were rendered during EOC coordination process meetings that included the Management and Coordination/General Staff, 2) while the Planning and Intelligence Section produced an EOC 909 Situation Report, and 3) while the Geographic Information System (GIS) Unit produced valuable maps; the information was not relayed to the EOC responders (as appropriate) nor displayed for their viewing. This is a perennial challenge for the City's EOC.

According to generally accepted ICS protocols, each EOC Section Coordinator, and in turn Branch Director, is to brief their Sections and Branches, respectively, on critical situation information and objectives/expectations following each briefing/meeting or as major developments occur. In many cases, these Section/Branch briefings did not occur or were limited to only a few staff. When they did occur, the content was often inconsistent and/or incomplete. In almost no case, was essential information relative to the Section/Branch, the status of other Sections (as appropriate), or EOC priorities and objectives regularly communicated to EOC responders (as appropriate) through the appropriate chain of command. One cause of these inconsistencies may be that few

Section Coordinators took notes during briefings/meetings despite being instructed to do so. Another cause may be that the Planning and Intelligence Section's 909 Incident Summary Report was not released to Section Coordinators/Branch Directors to assist with subsequent briefings. Another cause may be that position checklists for Section Coordinators and Branch Directors only reference briefing personnel under the initial activation activities. Those prompts are not repeated, nor do checklists identify what content should be included in those briefings (essential elements of information).

Although Section/Branch briefings would have made the most significant contribution to situational awareness/common operating picture, displays in the EOC could have helped mitigate the issue, but were not effectively used. A few of the EOC's large monitors were updated with static maps at various intervals, meeting times, and Branch/Section Report submission deadlines, but little else of much value was displayed. The GIS Unit could not keep maps updated in real-time because their workstations were not linked to the EOC's display system. The EOC Coordinator, for example, requested updated maps of POD sites and their status be posted on the large displays, but it only happened twice and the status information was inaccurate. In addition, each "pod" has a television that can be used by the Section Coordinator or Branch Director to display important information, tasks, maps, video, or other data. None of the "pods" used the television for any valuable purpose. Whether data is displayed on large displays, individual hard copies printed and handed out, documents placed on WebEOC for individual access, or information displayed on "pod" televisions; consistent and equal attention must be placed on providing EOC Sections and Branches with relevant and up-to-date information through any and all means available.

**Area for Improvement 2/3.2:** WebEOC has improved the reporting process for front-end users (e.g., Sections, Branches, Departments), but poses significant challenges to the compilation, validation, and production of synthesized macro-level intelligence on the back-end.

**Reference(s):** WebEOC

**Analysis:** The City has significantly increased the build out of the WebEOC boards and visual display interface since the 2014 Functional Exercise. Recent upgrades were tested for the first time during the 2015 exercise. One of the goals of the first phase work on WebEOC was to make the automated Branch and Section boards fast and easy-to-use for front-end users to upload situational information into template Section, Branch, and Department reports. During the exercise, the upgraded WebEOC did provide a faster and easy front end method to input situation information.

A second goal of the development phase was to provide the Planning and Intelligence Section the ability to draft the comprehensive, macro-level situation report for all meetings to support Management's critical decision making. Once incident information was entered, Branch and Section reports would be immediately accessible to the Planning and Intelligence Section. The final deliverable of the Section is to produce the Situation Report (EOC Form 909) from the inputs of individual Sections, Branches, and DOCs. Additionally, the Situation Report and Branch Report displays on WebEOC-boards is then an information sharing resource to ensure EOC responders are getting timely incident information.

During the exercise it was discovered that once entered into the system, Branch and Section inputs on the Situation Report could not be edited by the Situation Analysis Unit Leader. In addition, the Situation Analysis Unit Leader could not work on the input while it was being used by the front end-user. As a result, the reports included pages upon pages of situational information that was not redacted into a viable summarized Situation Report. To compensate, situational briefings from the Planning and Intelligence Section had to be quickly pulled together in the half-hour before the meetings from verbal talking points provided by EOC Section Coordinators and other leadership. The current version of WebEOC's information sharing boards did not support the Planning and Intelligence Section's role to: 1) dissect, validate, and vet raw incident reporting; and 2) provide good situation reporting through all resources including the displays. The technology challenges had a significant impact on the Section's process to develop a useful, significant, prioritized, and synthesized incident picture for management.

During the 2014 exercise, the EOC's approach to developing incident reports involved manually adding information to an MS Word document. While that was time consuming, it provided the Planning and Intelligence Section with direct capability to manage situation reporting inputs and to ensure all EOC Responders had guidance on the essential information needed. Working on merging the earlier information reporting resources with the speed and floor accessibility offered by using WebEOC, will significantly improve the reporting capabilities of the Planning and Intelligence Section.

**Area for Improvement 2/3.3:** Regular deadlines for the submission of situation updates should be established for all EOC Branches, Sections, and Departments regardless of the EOC Coordination Process schedule.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator Position Checklist

EOC Concept of Operations (ConOps)

**Analysis:** The exercise began at 08:30 hours, the EOC Coordination Meeting was scheduled for 12:30 hours, and the EOC Planning Meeting for 14:30 hours. Consequently, the Planning and Intelligence Section established 12:00 hours and 14:00 hours, respectively, as the only two deadlines for Branches, Sections, and Departments to submit situation reports. As a result, there was no urgency or action between 08:30 and 12:00 hours for any units to seek out and produce situation status updates. The Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator instructed all personnel to notify the Planning and Intelligence Section if anything important happened in the interim; however, this request was open to wide interpretation and did not create a sense of urgency, so little to no action was taken. While Branch Directors, Section Coordinators, and Agency Representatives should not require a deadline to seek and maintain information regarding situation status as it is required in EOC procedures, position checklists, and is communicated through training; the EOC staff nonetheless demonstrated a penchant for being reactive versus proactive. This may be a result of exercise artificialities that don't effectively establish the same mindset of urgency and peril among participants as do real-world emergencies. Nonetheless, related to the exercise environment, these deadlines for

situation updates were important. The lack thereof led to limited situational awareness within the EOC and limited action on the part of EOC staff to address the void.

**Area for Improvement 2/3.4:** The staffing plan for the Situation Analysis Unit must have the capability to surge proportionate to the activation level and conditions.

**Reference(s):** EOC Staffing Plan (Form 903) and Organization Chart (Form 907)

**Analysis:** At the start of the exercise, the Situation Analysis Unit was staffed by only three (3) personnel. The Police Department did not staff its assigned support position, which would have made it four (4) and that information was never communicated to the Management Section. Within minutes, the Situation Analysis Unit was overwhelmed by the quantity of raw data it was receiving (e.g., data from all departments related continuity of operations, all Branches/Sections related to dispensing operations, 89 PODs, the County Department of Public Health). As a result, major deliverables were set aside (e.g., EOC 909 Forms, WebEOC Significant Events Lists, WebEOC Executive Dashboard for the Management Section) while the Unit tried to get its arms around its purpose and a process to synthesize raw data. While software issues and deficiencies in Section management exacerbated the issue, even a fully capable Situation Analysis Unit would have struggled with the same volume of data. The Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator submitted a personnel resource request to the Logistics Section, but due to the exercise artificiality it could only be filled notionally. The capabilities of the Unit had nearly come to a halt when the EOC Coordinator recruited a number of EMD interns to provide support staffing. This was outside the exercise's parameters; however, the additional staff immediately increased the productivity of the Unit and it went on to develop an EOC 909 Incident Summary, POD status maps, and a rudimentary Significant Events List.

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**Objective 4:** Evaluate the ability of the City of Los Angeles to communicate with the Los Angeles County DPH DOC to coordinate (including the integration of a Public Health Technical Specialist in the EOC Planning and Intelligence Section) and implement an effective MCM response during a public health emergency; specifically, the dispensing of mass prophylaxis at eighty-nine (89) PODs in the City of Los Angeles.

The critical tasks associated with this objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective, but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with this objective are described in this section.

### Strengths

The following strengths related to this objective were demonstrated during the exercise and contributed to the objective being met:

**Strength 4.1:** The in-person involvement of County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health representatives in the City of Los Angeles' EOC created a rare and invaluable opportunity to enhance communications and understanding between the two entities. A Public Health Agency Representative provided process and policy guidance to the Management Section and a Technical Specialist provided detailed advice on plans and procedures to the Planning and Intelligence and Management Sections.

**Strength 4.2:** While ongoing and more frequent joint preparedness efforts are still necessary, this exercise's planning process presented an opportunity for the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health to collaborate on more emergency management than is the norm. Both entities demonstrated an eagerness to work together and collaborate beyond the exercise to improve planning and response capabilities.

**Strength 4.3:** Through coordination with the Public Health Technical Specialist and Disabilities and Access and Functional Needs (DAFN) Technical Specialist, the Animal Services Unit was able to establish two free-standing PODs for individuals with service animals.

### Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with this objective:

**Area for Improvement 4.1:** A process should be developed to fully define and inform EOC personnel of the role, chain of command, and location of Technical Specialists when activated.

**Reference(s):** EOC Staffing Plan (Form 903) and Organization Chart (Form 907)

**Analysis:** The inclusion of the Public Health Technical Specialist in the exercise was a tremendous strength; however, EOC Responders struggled to identify, engage, and understand the role of the Public Health Technical Specialist. The Public Health Technical Specialist was assigned to the Planning and Intelligence Section, but was seated at a workstation at the “Emergency Management Pod.” In addition, the Technical Specialist was assigned a generic “Technical Specialist” vest and no announcement was made that a Public Health Technical Specialist was available in the EOC, which made it difficult for those unfamiliar with him to identify him or know of his presence. Those that were aware of his presence were frequently confused as to his role. Although assigned to her Section, the Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator took no responsibility for integrating the Public Health Technical Specialist or his expertise into the operations of that Section and its products (this was also true for the Disabilities, Access and Functional Needs [DAFN] Technical Specialist). The Public Health Technical Specialist was also called into most Management Section meetings (which was a strength); however, as a result, he was frequently absent from the EOC floor when consultations were needed and it gave EOC responders the impression he reported to the Management Section and his role might be policy-related and not technical. EOC responders were also unsure as to whether they could directly approach the Technical Specialist or whether formal requests for input had to go through a chain of command (e.g., the Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator) or through WebEOC (e.g., information requests). As a result, the Technical Specialist was well engaged by the Management Section, but significantly underutilized by the rest of the EOC.

**Area for Improvement 4.2:** The Los Angeles County Department of Public Health must engage the City of Los Angeles in a thorough critique of its existing Medical Countermeasures and Mass Prophylaxis Plans.

**Reference(s):** Medical Countermeasures Plan for the Los Angeles County Operational Area (Annex 6 of the Los Angeles County Operational Area All-Hazards Emergency Response Plan) and supporting annexes and procedures

**Analysis:** The Medical Countermeasures Plan that was tested during the exercise was developed by the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health primarily without the input of the City of Los Angeles. As described with Area for Improvement 4.2, a public health emergency can leave the City of Los Angeles’ response at the mercy of the Health Officer or in conflict with Health Department’s policies/procedures. During both the planning for and conduct of the exercise, the City of Los Angeles identified a number of issues with the Public Health Department’s current Medical Countermeasures strategy. The City of Los Angeles would like to work with the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health to address the following items:

- Drive-through PODs should be a viable option and tool used for dispensing operations in the City of Los Angeles. Drive-through PODs have proven effective in other jurisdictions and the City of Los Angeles has the infrastructure and many viable POD locations to dramatically enhance throughput via drive-through PODs.

- The current POD locations selected by the Department of Public Health for the City of Los Angeles have not been vetted or approved. Approximately half of the City of Los Angeles' PODs are identified as Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) sites. Neither the City nor the County have agreements with LAUSD to use their sites as PODs, and all LAUSD sites must be reconsidered. In addition, most of the PODs identified by the Public Health Department that are owned by the City of Los Angeles are facilities with minimal capabilities (e.g., limited parking, limited ingress/egress, non-ADA compliant, etc.). A vetting of all sites must be conducted to ensure they can support the intended POD objectives.
- The County's planning assumes the public will comply with all directives and few to no operational impediments (e.g., congestion, logistical delays, limited resource availability [including personnel]) will interfere with distribution or dispensing operations. The City of Los Angeles believes an incident of this magnitude, requiring activation of the Medical Countermeasures Plan for the Operational Area, will be a near catastrophic situation defined by major resource shortages, public misbehavior, extreme misinformation and rumors, major congestion, and distribution impediments, etc. As a result, the plan must realistically address these challenges and apply the appropriate resources, communication, and coordination necessary to achieve objectives.
- The current Medical Countermeasures Plan requires more than 45 staff at each POD for dispensing operations (this does not include ancillary functions such as traffic management, crowd management, mass care, public information, security, etc.). Future POD and Medical Countermeasure Plans should acknowledge potential staffing shortages and address the parameters for operating PODs with limited staffing or different staffing combinations. Future POD and Medical Countermeasure Plans should identify potential sources for personnel resources.
- The Medical Countermeasures Plan must include a pre-defined strategy for providing all emergency personnel involved with distribution and dispensing operations and the broader public safety and health community, and their families, with prophylactic medication in advance of their assignments to ensure assigned personnel will be willing and able to assist with emergency operations. The City of Los Angeles cannot guarantee any of its personnel, including sworn public safety staff, will be available to support mass prophylaxis activities without such assurances.
- PODs will report information to the Department of Public Health via multiple Service Planning Areas (SPAs). Data will then be summarized by the Public Health Department by SPA. The SPAs do not correlate to geographic or geopolitical boundaries. Portions of the City of Los Angeles are included in multiple SPAs; many of which also include other jurisdictions/territories beyond the City of Los Angeles. The SPA data Public Health reports to the City of Los Angeles will be of little to no value unless it is translated to City of Los Angeles boundaries.

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**Objective 5:** Evaluate the ability of the City of Los Angeles to coordinate, request resources, and share and receive situational information with the Operational Area EOC through a County of Los Angeles OEM Agency Representative in the City EOC.

The critical tasks associated with this objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective, but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with this objective are described in this section.

### Strengths

No strengths were identified by the evaluation team related to this objective.

### Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with this objective:

**Area for Improvement 5.1:** There was either reluctance or an inability by the Operational Area (Office of Emergency Management) to assign a representative to the City of Los Angeles EOC in preparation for the exercise.

**Reference(s):** Joint City and County of Los Angeles (JCCLA) Memorandum of Understanding

**Analysis:** In preparation for the exercise, multiple requests were submitted to the Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management (OEM) for an Operational Area liaison to staff a position in the City's EOC during the exercise. The Operational Area demonstrated a reluctance or inability to assign a liaison in advance of the exercise. Approximately fifteen (15) minutes after the start of the exercise, an OEM representative arrived at the City EOC – until that moment, the City was unsure if a representative would be participating and who that representative would be. According to the Joint City and County of Los Angeles (JCCLA) Memorandum of Understanding (JCCLA §3.b.3) the County will always and automatically assign an Operational Area liaison to the City EOC whenever it is activated. A formal request should not be required and there should be no debate on the subject. Likewise, whenever the City and County EOCs are activated for a common purpose, the City of Los Angeles is poised to send a City liaison to the County EOC without a formal request or undue delay (JCCLA §3.c). The County EOC was not activated for this exercise so that portion of the agreement was not demonstrated.

**Area for Improvement 5.2:** There was a missed opportunity to rehearse information sharing, strategy coordination, and resource management between the City of Los Angeles and Operational Area.

**Reference(s):** 2015 City of Los Angeles Functional Exercise, Exercise Plan (ExPlan)

Joint City and County of Los Angeles (JCCLA) Memorandum of Understanding

**Analysis:** The Operational Area EOC was ultimately unavailable to participate. The City of Los Angeles crafted this objective in the early stages of the exercise planning process with the anticipation of rehearsing information sharing, strategy coordination, and resource management between the City and Operational Area during the exercise. This objective could not be demonstrated because the Operational Area/OEM liaison assigned to the City EOC was not able to communicate with the County/Operational Area EOC to then provide back to the City EOC any information of value, offer OA policy/leadership input, or fulfill resource requests.

**Area for Improvement 5.3:** Because of the Operational Area's limited participation, the potential consequences of the City's strategic decisions and public information on other OA Members were not brought to its attention.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

EOC Coordination Process Forms and Procedures

**Analysis:** Credit is given to the City's leadership for proactively making strategic decisions under pressure and in the absence of other guidance. However, many of the City's decisions and public information releases would have had cascading impacts on neighboring jurisdictions experiencing the same incident and challenges. For example, during the exercise, the EOC Management Section instructed Area Commands to manage traffic in anyway necessary to improve throughput (e.g., re-route traffic, close streets, turn roads into one-way routes) and authorized "drive-through" PODs where necessary. These decisions would have likely had impacts on neighboring jurisdictions or other regional implications. For example, many of the City's PODs are located along City borders with neighboring jurisdictions. Changing traffic patterns around those PODs could create traffic consequences in the neighboring jurisdiction. Likewise, word of "drive-through" PODs in the City of Los Angeles could drastically change the public's reaction to dispensing operations at "walk up" PODs throughout the rest of the Operational Area. It is the role of the Operational Area to identify, communicate, and adjudicate these cross-jurisdictional issues to ensure the resilience of the entire region not just the City of Los Angeles. As stated in Area for Improvement 5.2, the lack of participation by the Operational Area was a missed opportunity to rehearse this adjudication process between the City of Los Angeles and the Operational Area (on behalf of all other OA Members).

**Objective 6:** Demonstrate an EOC resource management capability that facilitates the identification of resource needs, prioritization of competing requests, acquisition of appropriate resources, effective mobilization and tracking, and involves effective communications among relevant stakeholders throughout the process.

The critical tasks associated with this objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective; however, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, but in some cases it was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with this objective are described in this section.

### Strengths

The following strengths related to this objective were demonstrated during the exercise and contributed to the objective being met:

**Strength 6.1:** Upgrades to WebEOC and subsequent trainings on WebEOC since the 2014 Functional Exercise allowed EOC responders to use the system for relaying three (3) types of resource requests: 1) information requests between individual positions; 2) mission taskings between Branches in the Operations Section; and 3) tangible resources from any EOC Section to the Logistics Section. In addition, WebEOC now allows request originators to attach files to the resource request within WebEOC, which not only saves transcription time, but ensures clarity. Use of the system helped improve the communication of essential elements of information and ensured resource requests reached intended recipients.

**Strength 6.2:** Demonstrating marked improvement from the 2014 Functional Exercise, the Logistics Section had a better grasp on the entire resource management process, particularly related to receiving and acknowledging resource requests from various Sections, vetting resource requests for essential elements of information, identifying internal city resources, and prioritizing resource requests when limited resources were available. In a number of cases the Logistics Section Coordinator was able to take a step back from individual tasks to provide just-in-time refresher training on the resource management process to section personnel.

**Strength 6.3:** The Finance and Administration Section developed an informative policy document providing detailed guidance on how to track costs for cost recovery purposes. The guidance document included information on the Cost Accounting System (i.e., disaster accounting codes) established by the Finance and Administration Section within two (2) hours of the start of the exercise. The guidance document was then conveyed to EOC Section Coordinators verbally, a hard copy was printed and handed out, and a copy was emailed to all EOC responders via WebEOC.

**Strength 6.4:** The EOC Coordinator, Deputy EOC Coordinator, and Emergency Management Department staff were helpful in consulting with Branches and Sections to

de-conflict resource requests and identify the appropriate channels through which to direct resource requests (i.e., mass care related requests that were elevated through the Fire/EMS Branch were properly directed to the Mass Care Branch with the input of the EOC Coordinator).

**Strength 6.5:** The three (3) Logistics Section Units staffed by the General Services Department (Supply, Ground Support, and Facilities) were proactive in identifying and inventorying city resources that may have been available to support the mass prophylaxis campaign.

## Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with this objective:

**Area for Improvement 6.1:** The capability to track resource fulfillment from the submission of a resource request to the mobilization and delivery of non-city resources was insufficient.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

**Analysis:** There was no observed interaction between the Logistics Section and the Resource Status Unit within the Planning and Intelligence Section. The Resource Status Unit should be notified when a resource request is received, when it is fulfilled and arrives, and if and when it is submitted to the Operational Area. In addition, the Resource Status Unit should be notified if the Logistics Section or others identify resource-related trends or potential shortfalls so those issues can be addressed through the EOC's planning/coordination process. This communication may occur with the assistance of technology (e.g., WebEOC) or in a manual process so long as the communication is maintained. Likewise, resource status information is of little value if it is not communicated to those with a need to know. Resource requestors (e.g., Operations Section Branches) should know how to review the status of their resource requests via WebEOC. In addition, communications between resource requestors and the Logistics Section should be improved on both sides: 1) the resource requestor should be more proactive in seeking updates from the Logistics Section; and 2) the Logistics Section should be more forthcoming with the dissemination of resource fulfillment updates.

**Area for Improvement 6.2:** The Finance and Administration Section needs to be more familiar with and able to manage the City's disaster procurement authorities.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

City of Los Angeles Emergency Procurement Authorities/Policies

**Analysis:** During the exercise, the Finance and Administration Section was presented with multiple prompts that should have triggered staff to identify and explain the City's emergency procurement authorities (e.g., circumvent the bid process, waive contracting requirements and licenses, increase/exceed spending limits, enter into non-traditional agreements, make cash purchases, etc.). While the Finance and Administration Section demonstrated some awareness of elements of the City's overall policy (e.g., spending limits) it failed to demonstrate a complete understanding of the entire process and

authorities. An awareness of that process should have then triggered closer coordination with the Logistics Section in the pursuit of resources.

In addition, the continuity of the City's procurement authority (systems and processes) falls on the Finance and Administration Section. The Section was unable to address multiple requests for information on the delegation of procurement authorities among City personnel. Complete awareness of the City's procurement capabilities (particularly the procurement flexibilities granted under a Proclamation of Local Emergency) and an ability to manage and maintain the process by the Finance and Administration Section is critical to the City's resource fulfillment abilities.

**Area for Improvement 6.3:** Coordination between the Logistics Section and Finance and Administration Section must be improved to support effective resource acquisition and financial tracking.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

**Analysis:** Within the first ten (10) minutes of the exercise, the Logistics and Finance and Administration Section Coordinators held a joint briefing which addressed the responsibilities of both Sections and introduced staff across Sections. Unfortunately, this level of coordination was not carried throughout the rest of the exercise. At no point did the Logistics and Finance and Administration Sections meet to discuss the process for acquiring non-city resources, available financial tools, and procurement flexibilities and limitations. As demonstrated through their side-by-side placement in the EOC, the Logistics and Finance and Administration Sections are mutually dependent; not only related to fulfilling resource requests, but also related to financial tracking, cost recovery, and supporting personnel needs (e.g., claims/compensation).

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**Objective 7:** Proclaim a Local Emergency and establish appropriate jurisdiction-wide priorities, strategies, policies, ordinances, rules, and regulations to address the current and foreseeable complexities of a public health emergency and to support or enhance mitigation and response measures.

The critical tasks associated with this objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective; however, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, but in some cases it was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with this objective are described in this section.

### Strengths

The following strengths related to this objective were demonstrated during the exercise and contributed to the objective being met:

**Strength 7.1:** Within the first hour of the exercise, the Management Section recognized the magnitude of the situation/scenario and promptly proclaimed a Local State of Emergency for the City of Los Angeles; acknowledging the necessity of a proclamation and the multiple benefits it offers the City's response and recovery efforts.

**Strength 7.2:** The EOC Director, with consultation from the two Deputy Directors, did not hesitate to make difficult decisions regarding the City's priorities, policies, or provide authorizations. Again recognizing the urgency and magnitude of the situation, the Management Section quickly addressed impediments to the mass prophylaxis campaign.

**Strength 7.3:** The Management Section proactively began considering the possible short- and long-term implications of the incident and response operations. They did not get caught up in only the current situation, but rather began to consider issues for the next and future Operational Periods; including the potential need for decontamination, medical and fatality management surge capabilities once prophylactic medications are no longer effective, and the long-term mental health impacts on City personnel and the community as a whole.

### Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with this objective:

**Area for Improvement 7.1:** Certain EOC personnel, particularly in the Operations and Management Sections, need to be more familiar with the City's emergency powers and authorities so they can recognize situations that may warrant their activation and thereby proactively request action.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles Administrative Code (LAAC), Division 8 - Special Authorities, Chapter 3 - Local Emergencies

**Analysis:** A Proclamation of Emergency gives the Mayor, and thereby the emergency organization of the City of Los Angeles, a great deal of authority to take actions that could mitigate challenges and benefit response and recovery activities. Some of those authorities may include:

- Controlling and directing the entire emergency organization of the City
- Requiring emergency service of any City officer or employee (Disaster Service Workers)
- Requisitioning necessary personnel or material of any City department or agency
- Binding the city to the fair value of any resource or, if urgent, commandeering the same for public use
- Population control measures (e.g., curfews, evacuations, restricted areas)
- Prevention of price gouging
- Restrictions/parameters on certain sales (e.g., alcohol, fuel, firearms, food)
- Approval of tactics with political/legal ramifications
- Permit/license/requirement suspensions

This exercise and its scenario offered an excellent opportunity for the Operations Section to proactively request the implementation of emergency powers to mitigate potential complications and support the mass prophylaxis campaign. However, EOC responders did not demonstrate a thorough understanding of the potential policies, ordinances, rules, and regulations that could benefit their efforts. As a result, the Management Section was not approached to implement those special authorities. Based on overall EOC performance, it can also be assumed that if EOC responders were aware of the authorities, they may not have known the process by which they should submit policy requests to the Management Section for consideration.

**Area for Improvement 7.2:** Awareness of City-wide priorities, proclamations, and policies (e.g., Common Operating Picture) was not communicated as necessary throughout the EOC.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

#### EOC Coordination Process Forms and Procedures

**Analysis:** This issue directly relates to the root cause identified in Area for Improvement 2.1 associated with Objective 2. While the City Proclaimed a Local State of Emergency in the first few hours of the response, notification of the proclamation was not made to necessary positions in the EOC. The Proclamation affects many EOC Sections, for example:

- It must be communicated to the Operational Area via the Operational Area Agency Representative or Planning and Intelligence Section.
- It activates the emergency powers/authorities of the Mayor, which the Planning and Intelligence and Operations Section must be aware of when identifying policies that could benefit tactical operations.
- It creates legal and liability protections and flexibilities, which affect the Finance and Administration Section.
- It authorizes the City to request resources from the Operational Area and creates procurement flexibilities, which both the Logistics and Finance and Administration Sections must be aware of as they pursue resources.

The Proclamation, however, was not the only policy not communicated to necessary groups in the EOC. The Management Section authorized the Disaster Service Worker (DSW) program, but that information was only shared with the Logistics Section. During the exercise, the Management Section directly authorized the four Area Commands to use any methods necessary to enhance throughput at PODs (including converting walk-through PODs to drive-through PODs, altering traffic patterns, increasing security, etc.). Those decisions had cascading impacts on the Operations Section and respective DOCs, but it was not communicated to appropriate positions in the EOC. During the initial floor briefing by the EOC Director, a shelter-in-place order from the Operational Area Policy Group was conveyed to the EOC, but no further briefings or information releases addressed other policies or provided updates.

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**Objective 8:** Implement an effective and customized emergency public information campaign that addresses the medical countermeasures response, mitigates community-wide impacts of a public health emergency, and solicits the input of the Los Angeles County DPH and other relevant partners.

The critical tasks associated with this objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective, but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with this objective are described in this section.

### Strengths

The following strengths related to this objective were demonstrated during the exercise and contributed to the objective being met:

**Strength 8.1:** The Public Information staff was knowledgeable of the major public information task requirements. Upon activation, major tasks such as media monitoring, rumor control, media outlet identification, message development, WebEOC entry, and media briefing area set-up were listed on the group's dry/erase board and identified as tasks that needed to be accomplished by the team.

**Strength 8.2:** During the exercise, WebEOC was used to publish/share at least three (3) public information messages. The content of the messages was intended to reassure the public with respect to the actions the City of Los Angeles was taking to address the situation, facts about the hazard/threat, information regarding the location of PODs, and what do with pets/service animals as coordinated with the Mass Care Branch.

**Strength 8.3:** The Public Information staff recognized the need for regular media briefings and scheduled hourly media briefings (nationalized) for the duration of the event.

### Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with this objective:

**Area for Improvement 8.1:** The Public Information function was not adequately staffed for the magnitude of the public information campaign and used that as a reason to notionalize all its functions.

**Reference(s):** EOC Staffing Plan (Form 903) and Organization Chart (Form 907)

**Analysis:** During the exercise there were only three (3) agency representatives staffing the Public Information function. This led the Public Information staff to make a decision to notionalize all exercise activities instead of performing tasks and actions as if the incident were real as instructed by Exercise Control staff. This created a missed

opportunity to play through the challenges, prioritize activities using the staff available, propose/discuss priorities with the Management Section, and request additional support. Since the Public Information function reports to the EOC Director and Deputy Directors, it was an oversight on the part of management that the public information function lapsed and was not set on a corrected course.

With the 30-50% projected absenteeism rate associated with this scenario, performance of all desired public information functions would be challenging if the incident had been real. This exercise artificiality turned out to be a reality with only three (3) staff members present. In a real world emergency, notionalizing the public information functions would not be an option. Regardless of known or perceived staff availability, the Public Information staff needs to request resources required to do all the essential public information functions and do its best to produce in the interim. Creative staffing options (using non-technical personnel to monitor the media, for example) and requesting assistance from all potential sources (e.g., mutual aid) should be considered whenever a staffing shortfall occurs.

**Area for Improvement 8.2:** A thoughtful and strategic Public Information Plan was not developed to guide the overall public information campaign/strategy.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

#### PIO Position Checklists

**Analysis:** Developing an overall strategy for the public information campaign would have allowed the PIO and the public information staff to develop a strategic approach for managing emergency public information, handling rumor control, coordinating messages, identifying the functions required, and prioritize messages and activities. It is an efficient way to articulate the overall public information approach to the Management Section. Although Public Information procedures, checklists, and training all address the need, timing, and content for said plan, no such plan was developed during the exercise. As a result, the public information function failed to make functional assignments, track actions and progress, and consistently share information as a group regarding the functions and actions that each other were taking. This eventually led to a reactionary operation where staff only tackled the issues they were directly presented verses being proactive. In addition, the lack of process and information management would make it difficult for staff from the next operational period to transition and track trends and operational progress.

**Area for Improvement 8.3:** Crisis information was not gathered from or shared with the EOC or DOCs and was not coordinated with the Los Angeles County Joint Information Center (JIC).

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Master Plan and Procedures

**Analysis:** Public information is a critical function of the EOC. The mismanagement of public information can have a devastating impact on both the jurisdiction as well as the public. It is essential that accurate, timely, and consistent information be disseminated to the public. It is also essential that the Public Information group work closely with all EOC Section Coordinators as part of the EOC information gathering and sharing process.

The public information group did not have a handle on the types of messaging required to have a successful public information campaign. Although initially the group produced three (3) relevant press releases, the operation became reactionary and did not include advance planning or anticipation of message needs based on communication and situational awareness that would have come from communicating with other EOC Section, appropriate DOCs, and the County JIC.

The only messages coordinated and approved for release during the exercise were generic (e.g., “what is government doing,” POD locations, and some information about the hazard/threat). No messages were published with respect to public safety, employee safety, directions regarding the shelter-in-place order, or any “one message/many voices” in concert with the Los Angeles County JIC or Public Health Department regarding POD access, hours, resources, where to find medication instructions, etc.

Although regular media briefings were scheduled, the messaging and the coordination to determine the appropriate messenger (Mayor, Police/Fire Chief, joint conferences with Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, etc.) were not developed with information from EOC Sections, DOCs, or other public information partners.

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**Objective 9:** Demonstrate the ability of City DOCs to coordinate information, resources, and response priorities to address the impacts of a public health emergency on their specific department's operations and in accordance with directives from the City EOC.

The critical tasks associated with this objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective, but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with this objective are described in this section.

### Strengths

The following strengths related to this objective were demonstrated during the exercise and contributed to the objective being met:

**Strength 9.1:** During the exercise, DOCs and BOCs with pre-existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) worked through those documented processes and actively adapted those that were not effective by adding or modifying elements to include operationally appropriate steps. DOCs generally did an exceptional job of identifying procedural deficiencies or inaccuracies within understood or documented processes. For example, when the Department of Recreation and Parks (RAP) identified gaps, inconsistencies, or inefficiencies in information flow between the field, DOC and EOC, it immediately altered the process, information or communication flow to resolve the issue. Similarly, when the Los Angeles Police Department's Real-Time Analysis and Critical Response (RACR) Division determined that additional information or training was required to accompany its pre-established policies, it catalogued the gaps, and altered standard reporting charts to more accurately represent useful situational awareness.

**Strength 9.2:** Many DOCs reported strong leadership from their DOC staff. This included taking proactive steps to improve DOC efficiency by establishing communication processes with staff, conducting meetings/briefings, reviewing DOC and position responsibilities as a group, adjudicating roles where confusion existed, and providing a common direction for the DOC.

**Strength 9.3:** Many DOCs utilized a myriad of available tools to track and share information as well as track task status. For example, RAP, the Housing and Community Investment Department (HCIDLA), and the Information Technology Agency (ITA) reported the creation of activity logs and tracking sheets that were shared in real-time on "Google Drives" throughout the DOC. Department representative(s) in the EOC also had access to the Google Drives and shared documentation. This tracking showed itemized lists of Department priorities and activities that allowed for real-time status tracking, "load balancing," and adjustments to the delegation of assignments as necessary during the exercise.

## Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with this objective:

**Area for Improvement 9.1:** The City of Los Angeles' DOC-centric emergency operations model is dependent on the successful performance of DOCs; however, each DOC has its own understanding of its purpose and the degree of DOC capabilities varies widely in the absence of a centralized policy and framework.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Master Plan and Procedures  
DOC Operations Manual or Framework

**Analysis:** Under the emergency operations structure used in the City of Los Angeles, each Department is responsible for establishing and operating a DOC to manage and coordinate response and recovery efforts for its internal operations as well as to the community relevant to its discipline. The success of the City's overall response is dependent on the performance of each DOC in its area of service. DOCs are, in essence, their own EOCs, responsible for establishing department/discipline priorities and policies, communicating and coordinating with relevant stakeholders, and managing information and resources for the department. The City EOC then exists to support the needs of those individual DOCs and adjudicate issues across DOCs when they arise.

From the DOCs that participated in the exercise, frustration was shared regarding the lack of consistency and general understanding between DOCs and the EOC regarding the mission and purpose of each entity. While some operational nuances are to be expected among DOCs, the need/desire for a consistent understanding of purpose, structure, and communications was evident. While a number of DOCs had established their own processes prior to the exercise, the exercise made evident that a number of DOCs were not staffed with appropriate personnel (either quantity or expertise), did not understand the overall City structure or roles associated with the field (including Area Commands), and critical information pathways were not established or utilized between the EOC and DOCs. Significant challenges were present in coordinating objectives, situational information, communicating appropriate information, accounting for Department personnel, and the status of essential functions.

**Area for Improvement 9.2:** Departments do not have enough trained staff to perform DOC functions for full DOC activations or to cover operations lasting more than one Operational Period.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles Administrative Code (LAAC), Division 8 - Special Authorities, Chapter 3 - Local Emergencies  
City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Master Plan and Procedures  
Mayor's Executive Order #15 and #17  
DOC Operations Manual or Framework

**Analysis:** Even DOCs with robust plans, equipment, and capabilities fall short with their numbers of trained and qualified staff to operate DOCs, particularly in large scale

incidents or over multiple Operational Periods. This exercise demonstrated a number of perennial issues regarding department priorities related to emergency preparedness, in particular, not proactively assigning and training a sufficient number of staff to be DOC responders, and not mandating those individuals access the tools and participate in events necessary to successfully fill the position assigned. This issue is equally true of department approaches for staffing the City EOC.

**Area for Improvement 9.3:** A Common Operating Picture (COP) and Citywide priorities were not communicated to each DOC from the EOC.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

EOC Coordination Process Forms and Procedures

**Analysis:** This evaluation directly relates to Area for Improvement 2/3.1. Because situational information and the status of policies and priorities were not effectively communicated throughout the EOC, they were not then relayed from the EOC to DOCs. Most DOCs commented that the EOC felt like a “black hole.” Information (relevant or not) was shared from DOCs to the EOC, but very little information was provided back to each DOC. The briefings and situational updates that were provided to the EOC Management Section needed to be shared with all EOC Sections and positions, as well as with each DOC, as appropriate. Of particular concern was a lack of employee health and safety information, the anthrax threat, or any plans for distributing medication to agencies other than the Police Department and Fire Department.

**Area for Improvement 9.4:** WebEOC is not currently available at DOCs, but could help improve DOC/EOC communications if made available.

**Reference(s):** WebEOC Software, Policies, and Training

**Analysis:** WebEOC (like other emergency management information systems) is a highly customizable and robust communications platform that has the ability to support situational awareness, resource management, action/coordination planning, and communications across many organizations and user-groups in different locations. With more than 40 departments, bureaus, and offices, the City of Los Angeles would benefit from universal accessibility throughout the Emergency Operations Organization (EOO). Reinforcing the corrective actions from the After Action Reports for the City’s 2013 and 2014 Functional Exercises, WebEOC enhancements still need to be done to improve the system’s use among DOCs and the EOC. While DOCs should not be trained to be solely dependent on a computer-based information system, it can significantly contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency operations when it is available and fully utilized by all elements of the City’s response network.

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**Objective 10:** Evaluate the ability of City of Los Angeles departments and agencies to select and implement appropriate continuity strategies as a result of personnel absenteeism rates between 30% - 50%.

The critical tasks associated with this objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective, but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with this objective are described in this section.

### Strengths

The following strengths related to this objective were demonstrated during the exercise and contributed to the objective being met:

**Strength 10.1:** Despite departments not officially activating their Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP), a few departments evaluated essential functions and the use/assignment of staff for the chosen priority functions.

**Strength 10.2:** During the planning for and conduct of the exercise, HCIDLA took the opportunity to prepare/review COOP checklists and used them to prioritize essential functions during the exercise, and thereby make decisions on the suspension of functions and assignment of staff.

### Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with this objective:

**Area for Improvement 10.1:** The importance of activating Department COOP Plans or implementing continuity strategies was not recognized as a priority by the EOC or most DOCs despite the scenario.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles Department COOP Plans

**Analysis:** While the need for additional staff was recognized as a priority by the activation of the Disaster Services Worker (DSW) program, further acknowledgement of other strategies to prioritize City functions to free up resources were not. The EOC Management Section did not make a recommendation to the Mayor to direct the activation of COOP Plans, nor did it encourage City departments to assess their essential functions and reduce operational capacity to minimum levels to free up resources for emergency functions. In addition, there was no discussion of EMD Bulletins (a common tool for recommending emergency measures) be used to recommend that Department's implement continuity strategies. Even without an executive-level recommendation, the scenario (and associated absenteeism rates) should have made it obvious that continuity plans were necessary. However, no DOC recognized the indicators and officially activated their COOP Plans. Most DOC responders acknowledged a lack of familiarity

with continuity concepts and many noted their departments either do not have a current COOP Plan or are not familiar enough with the plan to exercise/use it.

**Area for Improvement 10.2:** DOC personnel were unaware of the process for requesting additional staff (non-emergency, emergency, DSW, and otherwise) from the EOC.

**Reference(s):** City of Los Angeles EOC Policy and Procedures Manual

City of Los Angeles Department COOP Plans

**Analysis:** While DOC responders were challenged with the lack of personnel resources, they were equally perplexed regarding the process to fill personnel gaps. They were unaware that the DOC/EOC resource request process is the same for personnel as it is for all other types of resources. In addition, they failed understand the DOC/EOC resource request process is not limited to field activities, but is available to support any and all essential functions of the City. The root cause for this confusion lays in a general lack of understanding of the tenants of the COOP, resource management, and DSW programs and how they complement each other.

**Objective 11:** Effectively demonstrate the activation of the Disaster Service Worker (DSW) program across all city departments/agencies; and have each department support the mobilization of one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel per twelve (12)-hour shift in accordance with the “Activation of the Disaster Service Worker Program Standard Operating Procedure” (dated 10/10/2014).

The critical tasks associated with this objective were completed in a manner that achieved the objective; however, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, but in some cases it was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The strengths and areas for improvement, and more importantly, the root causes, associated with this objective are described in this section.

### Strengths

The following strengths related to this objective were demonstrated during the exercise and contributed to the objective being met:

**Strength 11.1:** The Management Section immediately recognized the need to activate the DSW program to support operational needs. During the Management Section’s initial organizing meeting at 08:40 hours, the EOC Deputy Director instructed an assistant to review the DSW procedures, arrange to send an EMD bulletin, and connect with the Personnel Department to initiate the process. The Mayor’s Liaison was tasked with seeking the Mayor’s approval. The Mayor’s Liaison was aware of the draft policy memorandum and quickly sought approval from the Mayor (simulated) to implement the program. The approval process was informed and timely.

**Strength 11.2:** The EOC Personnel Unit Leader and Personnel DOC staff was very knowledgeable about the tasks required to implement the DSW program. The Personnel Unit Leader had a mastery of the process and shared it with other key stakeholders (e.g., Logistics Section Coordinator, Public Information Officer, Management Section) to ensure the program’s proper activation. In addition, the Personnel DOC staff understood all the steps needing to occur to seek out DSWs from the City’s departments/agencies/bureaus to satisfy the resource request once the program was activated.

### Areas for Improvement

The following root causes require improvement to achieve the full capability level associated with this objective:

**Area for Improvement 11.1:** Awareness of, and training on, the DSW activation Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is limited and may currently result in single points of failure. The exercise demonstrated there are insufficient resources to implement the program to acquire large numbers of personnel.

**Reference(s):** “Activation of the Disaster Service Worker Program” Standard Operating Procedure and Training

**Analysis:** While it was very clear the Personnel Unit Leader understood his responsibilities related to the activation of the DSW program; the process and individual roles in the process were not as clear to the other key stakeholders involved, particularly the role and involvement of Department DOCs. The DSW Activation SOP was developed in 2014 and most of the past SOP training has been limited to Department Personnel Officers (DPOs). At the time of the exercise, it appeared the successful implementation of the program was dependent on a few informed individuals within the Personnel Department and only the DPOs from each Department. Awareness of the SOP and training on it for all involved positions will be essential to future activations.

As articulated in the City’s 2014 Functional Exercise After-Action Report, activating the DSW program is not straightforward and requires significant resources. As demonstrated during the exercise, when the DSW program was activated it required many more individuals (Personnel DOC cadre, DPOs, and supervisors) to notify, identify, and activate available personnel and match skill sets to the need. As a result of the intensity of the task, only one hundred and eighty seven (187) DSWs were identified for the first shift and three hundred and thirty eight (338) for the second shift, during the entire exercise (1,800 were needed for each shift).

**Area for Improvement 11.2:** DOCs were not made aware of the activation of the DSW program.

**Reference(s):** “Activation of the Disaster Service Worker Program” Standard Operating Procedure and Training

**Analysis:** While the need for the DSW program was recognized early in the exercise; because situational information, policies, and priorities were not effectively communicated throughout the EOC and DOCs, information regarding the activation of the DSW program was not properly communicated. Activation of the DSW program is something that affects every City Department, whether they provide the Department an avenue to find additional personnel or the Department is selected to provide resources to another Department whose operations are impacted. In either case, every Department must be made aware of the activation of the program.

**Area for Improvement 11.3:** The functionality of the DSW program and its personnel resources were misunderstood by many elements in the EOC.

**Reference(s):** “Activation of the Disaster Service Worker Program” Standard Operating Procedure and Training

**Analysis:** Those aware of the DSW program activation (e.g., the Management Section, Section Coordinators) presumed DSWs were the solution for every personnel resource

gap without understanding the skillsets, process, or availability. This led to a failure to recognize a serious personnel shortage when only one hundred and eighty seven (187) of eighteen hundred (1,800) DSWs were identified for the first shift and three hundred and thirty eight (338) for the second. Leadership positions improperly assumed all personnel shortages would be filled by DSWs without further consideration. No follow-on discussions ensued to create strategies to compensate for the lack of available personnel resources.

In addition, the DSW request that was initiated by the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health was summarily rejected by the Management Section, who indicated, “the City will use City staff to support City operations.” The request from Los Angeles County clearly stated the request for personnel was intended to support operations at the eighty-nine (89) PODs within the City. In addition to root causes identified in Area for Improvement 4.2 (regarding DPH and City coordination), these cases appear to result from a general lack of familiarity with the DSW process, how requests are processed, and the intended purpose and use of DSW personnel.

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## APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Based on the evaluations contained in this After-Action Report, this Improvement Plan (IP) has been developed to capture the corrective actions agreed to by the participating organizations and identifies information relevant to the monitoring of progress related to each corrective action.

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
Objective 1: Demonstrate an effective Level 3 "Alpha" Activation of the City EOC appropriate and proportionate for the public health emergency and medical countermeasures response anticipated.	1.1: Selection of an EOC Director should be based on qualifications rather than discipline/department.	EMD will continue to pursue Corrective Actions 1.1.2 (Staffing Requirements) and 1.1.4 (EOC Staff Credentialing) from the 2014 Functional Exercise Improvement Plan.	Planning Organization	High	EMD	Operations Division	Ongoing	April 2017
		1.1.1. Upon development of a credentialing program, EMD will develop a list of qualified/credentialed EOC Directors.	Organization	Medium	EMD	Operations Division	Dependent on the completion of Corrective Actions 1.1.2 and 1.1.4 from the 2014 Improvement Plan	Within 6 Months
	1.2: Section Coordinators and Branch Directors tend to become involved in the individual tasks or minutiae assigned to their Sections/Branches at the cost of effective Section/Branch	EMD will continue to pursue Corrective Actions 1.1.2 (Staffing Requirements) and 1.1.4 (EOC Staff Credentialing) from the 2014 Functional Exercise Improvement Plan.	Planning Organization	High	EMD	Operations Division	Ongoing	April 2017
		1.2.1. Training for Section Coordinators and Branch Directors will continue to emphasize the importance	Training	Medium	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	Ongoing	Ongoing

<sup>1</sup> Capability Elements are: Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, or Exercise.

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
	leadership and communications.	of managing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Section/Branch as a whole and future trainings (e.g., 400-level) will also emphasize this role.						
		1.2.2. Position checklists will be revised to better capture the leadership/ management responsibilities of Section Coordinators and Branch Directors to include more direct prompts for such activities.	Planning	High	EMD	Operations Division	June 2016	June 2017
		1.2.3. EMD will develop a strategy for offering more frequent and accessible (e.g., online) trainings, drills, and exercise opportunities for EOC personnel to rehearse their skills more often than once a year.	Training Exercise	High	EMD	Operations Division	Ongoing	August 2016
	1.3: The role, composition, functionality, and coordination of Area (Bureau) Commands during widespread emergencies requires further development to achieve effective results.	1.3.1. The Fire, Police, and Emergency Management Departments will reaffirm the value and intended ongoing use of the Bureau/Area Command model for wide-scale incident management.	Planning Organization	Medium	Fire Department	TBD	February 2016	August 2016
		1.3.2. Upon a decision to continue the Bureau/Area Command model, the Fire Dept. will engage all departments that may play a	Planning Training Exercise	Medium	Fire Department	TBD	Dependent on the results of Corrective Action 1.3.1	Within 1 Year

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
		role in multi-agency Area Commands in a formal planning and concept development process, along with the creation of a training and exercise program to address the role, composition, functionality and coordination of multi-agency Area Commands.						
<p>Objective 2: Rehearse the EOC's documented planning/coordination process for the "managed phase" of a public health emergency.</p> <p>Objective 3: In coordination with City DOCs and partner agencies, evaluate the City EOC's ability to collect, prioritize, document, maintain, and disseminate situational awareness and a common operating picture regarding the City's medical countermeasures</p>	<p>2/3.1: A lack of Section and Branch briefings to subordinates and insufficient information display/dissemination strategies resulted in a lack of awareness of critical information some EOC Sections had throughout the rest of the EOC (as appropriate).</p>	EMD will continue to pursue Corrective Actions 1.1.2 (Staffing Requirements) and 1.1.4 (EOC Staff Credentialing) from the 2014 Functional Exercise Improvement Plan.	Planning Organization	High	EMD	Operations Division	Ongoing	April 2017
		2/3.1.1. EOC checklists and the EOC Concept of Operations Template will be updated to include prompts and content (essential elements of information) for the regular Section and Branch briefings required in the EOC Policy and Procedures Manual.	Planning	High	EMD	Operations Division	June 2016	June 2017
		2/3.1.2. Training for Section Coordinators and Branch Directors will continue to emphasize the importance of Section/Branch Briefings and information sharing and future trainings (e.g., 400-level) will also emphasize this function.	Training	Medium	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	Ongoing	Ongoing

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>i</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
response and the community-wide impacts of a public health emergency.		2/3.1.3. EMD will review its EOC information dissemination and display strategies, and make enhancements as appropriate, to ensure the strategies include all relevant tools and systems (e.g., hard copies, emails, maps, briefings, video displays [GIS connectivity to displays], "Pod" televisions, WebEOC) available to reduce the workload on EOC personnel and offer the widest and most useful distribution.	Planning	High	EMD	Operations Division	February 2016	August 2016
		2/3.1.4. The EMD will consider expanding the EOC Coordinator function/Emergency Management "pod" to provide a greater capacity for Section Coordinator and Branch Director coaching during real-world activations.	Organization	High	EMD	Operations Division	February 2016	August 2016
	2/3.2: WebEOC has improved the reporting process for front-end users (e.g., Sections, Branches, Departments), but poses significant challenges to the compilation,	2/3.2.1. A comprehensive review of WebEOC will occur to include EMD staff with Planning & Intelligence Section experience to address the needed revisions to WebEOC information sharing boards to facilitate the EOC's	Equipment	High	EMD	Operations Division Planning Unit	Ongoing	February 2017

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
	validation, and production of synthesized macro-level intelligence on the back-end.	process for situational awareness, information sharing, and the needs of the Planning and Intelligence Section.						
		2/3.2.2. The EOC Form 909 reporting feature within WebEOC will be modified to give the Planning and Intelligence Section complete editorial control over the report's contents and formatting without having to change the original inputs.	Equipment	High	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	Ongoing	November 2016
	2/3.3: Regular deadlines for the submission of situation updates should be established for all EOC Branches, Sections, and Departments regardless of the EOC Coordination Process schedule.	2/3.3.1. The EOC Concept of Operations and potentially WebEOC boards/notices will be updated to include prompts for regular deadlines for situation reports to contribute to ongoing situational awareness, regardless of the EOC Coordination Process schedule.	Planning Equipment	Low	EMD	Planning Unit Operations Division	August 2016	February 2017
		2/3.3.2. EMD EOC Training (particularly its 301 course and future 400-level courses) will continue to reinforce the need for each unit to seek out and maintain information on situation status regardless of whether it's been	Training	Low	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	Ongoing	Ongoing

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
		assigned that responsibility or a deadline.						
	2/3.4: The staffing plan for the Situation Analysis Unit must have the capability to surge proportionate to the activation level and conditions.	2/3.4.1. EMD EOC Training (particularly its 301 course and future 400-level courses) will continue to reinforce the need for each unit to assess staffing needs and proactively request personnel resources as needed.	Training	Low	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	Ongoing	Ongoing
Objective 4: Evaluate the ability of the City of Los Angeles to communicate with the Los Angeles County DPH DOC to coordinate (including the integration of a Public Health Technical Specialist in the EOC Planning and Intelligence Section) and implement an effective MCM response during a public health emergency; specifically, the dispensing of mass prophylaxis at eighty-nine (89)	4.1: A process should be developed to fully define and inform EOC personnel of the role, chain of command, and location of Technical Specialists when activated.	4.1.1. A simple checklist or procedure will be developed detailing the process by which a Technical Specialist is on-boarded, where they are positioned (i.e., as a Technical Specialist assigned to a Section, Agency Representative assigned to the Liaison Officer, etc.), how the EOC is made aware of their presence, and the process for EOC personnel to engage the Technical Specialist.	Planning	Medium	EMD	Operations Division	February 2016	August 2016
	4.2: The Los Angeles County Department of Public Health must engage the City of Los Angeles in a thorough critique of its existing Medical Countermeasures and Mass	4.2.1. The EMD and Los Angeles County DPH will jointly review, critique, and identify solutions to improve the Medical Countermeasures Plan for the Operational Area to ensure practicality and address the concerns	Planning	High	LA County DPH  EMD	EPRP Policy and Planning Division  Planning Unit	February 2016	February 2017

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
PODs in the City of Los Angeles.	Prophylaxis Plans.	identified in this report. The DPH will ultimately revise the Medical Countermeasures plan as appropriate.						
		4.2.2. Los Angeles County DPH will provide the EMD with the position papers DPH is authoring related to the Medical Countermeasures Plan for review and comment.	Planning	High	LA County DPH	EPRP Policy and Planning Division	February 2016	February 2017
Objective 5: Evaluate the ability of the City of Los Angeles to coordinate, request resources, and share and receive situational information with the Operational Area EOC through a County of Los Angeles OEM Agency Representative in the City EOC.	5.1: There was either reluctance or an inability by the Operational Area (Office of Emergency Management) to assign a representative to the City of Los Angeles EOC in preparation for the exercise.	5.1.1. The Los Angeles County OEM should institutionalize a process and capability to identify and automatically deploy a qualified Operational Area liaison to the City of Los Angeles EOC whenever it is activated.	Planning Organization	High	LA County OEM	Administrator	February 2016	Ongoing
		5.1.2. The EMD will continue to invite Operational Area liaisons to the City's EOC training courses to ensure their familiarity with and ability to operate within the City's EOC.	Training	Medium	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	In Progress	Ongoing
	5.2: There was a missed opportunity to rehearse information sharing, strategy coordination, and resource management	5.2.1. The City and County of Los Angeles should jointly agree to participate in future regional training and exercise events to take advantage of as many opportunities as possible to	Training Exercise	High	EMD LA County OEM	General Manager Administrator	In Progress	Ongoing

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
	between the City of Los Angeles and Operational Area.	rehearse information sharing, strategy coordination, and resource management.						
	5.3: Because of the Operational Area's limited participation, the potential consequences of the City's strategic decisions and public information on other OA Members were not brought to its attention.	There are no additional correction actions beyond those associated with Area for Improvement 5.2.						
Objective 6: Demonstrate an EOC resource management capability that facilitates the identification of resource needs, prioritization of competing requests, acquisition of appropriate resources, effective mobilization and tracking, and involves effective communications among relevant stakeholders	6.1: The capability to track resource fulfillment from the submission of a resource request to the mobilization and delivery of non-city resources was insufficient.	6.1.1. The EOC Policy and Procedures Manual will be updated, or a supporting Standard Operating Procedure will be developed, to define the process and assignments for resource status tracking.	Planning	Medium	EMD	Planning Unit	September 2016	February 2017
		6.1.2. A quick reference checklist or guide will be developed for the Logistics Section that provides prompts for the resource status tracking procedure.	Planning	Low	EMD	Planning Unit	Contingent Upon Corrective Action 6.1.1	TBD
		6.1.3. The EMD and GSD will review the capabilities of WebEOC to determine how best it can be used for resource status tracking and associated information sharing.	Equipment	High	EMD GSD	Operations Division Emergency Management Coordinators	June 2016	February 2017

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
throughout the process.		6.1.4. EOC trainings will continue to describe the resource status tracking process and future 400-level EOC trainings will provide additional details and opportunities to rehearse the process.	Training	Medium	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	In Progress	Ongoing
	6.2: The Finance and Administration Section needs to be more familiar with and able to manage the City's disaster procurement authorities.	6.2.1. The EOC Policy and Procedures Manual will be updated, or a supporting Standard Operating Procedure will be developed, to define the Finance and Administration Section's role in the resource acquisition process; including the roles of the Procurement Unit, Contract Administration Unit, and potentially the Legal and Compensation/ Claims Units in the resource management cycle.	Planning	Medium	EMD	Planning Unit	September 2016	February 2017
		6.2.2. The EOC Policy and Procedures Manual and appropriate EOC position checklists will be revised to include references to the City's emergency procurement authorities/policies and associated procedures.	Planning	Medium	EMD	Planning Unit	September 2016	February 2017
		6.2.3. Future 400-level Finance and Administration Section training will be	Training	Medium	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	TBD	TBD

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
		designed to address the Section's role and procedures in facilitating emergency procurements.						
	6.3: Coordination between the Logistics Section and Finance and Administration Section must be improved to support effective resource acquisition and financial tracking.	Either future trainings or separate drills for the Logistics and Finance and Administration Sections (e.g., 400-level or potentially joint trainings or drills) will address the symbiotic relationship between the two Sections related to resource acquisition.	Training Exercise	Low	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	TBD	TBD
Objective 7: Proclaim a Local Emergency and establish appropriate jurisdiction-wide priorities, strategies, policies, ordinances, rules, and regulations to address the current and foreseeable complexities of a public health emergency and to support or enhance mitigation and response measures.	7.1: Certain EOC personnel, particularly in the Operations and Management Sections, need to be more familiar with the City's emergency powers and authorities so they can recognize situations that may warrant their activation and thereby proactively request action.	7.1.1. Either the EOC Policy and Procedures Manual will be revised or a supplemental fact sheet developed that identifies the menu of potential emergency authorities of the City and a process by which said authorities may be requested within the EOC.	Planning	Medium	EMD	Operations Division Planning Unit	February 2016	August 2016
		7.1.2. Appropriate EOC position checklists (e.g., Operations and Management Sections) will be updated to list the potential emergency authorities of the City, or at a minimum, provide a prompt for personnel to consider the need to request emergency authorities.	Planning	Low	EMD	Operations Division Planning Unit	June 2016	June 2017

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
	7.2: Awareness of City-wide priorities, proclamations, and policies (e.g., Common Operating Picture) was not communicated as necessary throughout the EOC.	There are no additional corrective actions beyond those associated with Area for Improvement 2/3.1.						
Objective 8: Implement an effective and customized emergency public information campaign that addresses the medical countermeasures response, mitigates community-wide impacts of a public health emergency, and solicits the input of the Los Angeles County DPH and other relevant partners.	8.1: The Public Information function was not adequately staffed for the magnitude of the public information campaign and used that as a reason to notionalize all its functions.	There are no additional corrective actions beyond those associated with Area for Improvement 2/3.4.						
	8.2: A thoughtful and strategic Public Information Plan was not developed to guide the overall public information campaign/strategy.	EMD will continue to pursue Corrective Actions 1.1.2 (Staffing Requirements) and 1.1.4 (EOC Staff Credentialing) from the 2014 Functional Exercise Improvement Plan.	Planning Organization	High	EMD	Operations Division	Ongoing	April 2017
		8.2.1. A template for a Public Information Plan will be developed for quick reference and population during a real-world incident.	Planning	Medium	EMD	Public Information	February 2016	August 2016
	8.3: Crisis information was not gathered from or shared with the EOC or DOCs and was not	EMD will continue to pursue Corrective Actions 1.1.2 (Staffing Requirements) and 1.1.4 (EOC Staff Credentialing) from the	Planning Organization	High	EMD	Operations Division	Ongoing	April 2017

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
	coordinated with the Los Angeles County Joint Information Center (JIC).	2014 Functional Exercise Improvement Plan.						
		8.3.1. Current and future PIO trainings (e.g., 301 and 400-level) will continue to communicate the importance of working with the EOC Section Coordinators and Management to maintain situational awareness, provide the EOC with data from media/public-sources, and the importance of proactive messaging.	Training	Low	EMD	Public Information  Operations Division, Training Unit	Ongoing	Ongoing
Objective 9: Demonstrate the ability of City DOCs to coordinate information, resources, and response priorities to address the impacts of a public health emergency on their specific department's operations and in accordance with directives from the City EOC.	9.1: The City of Los Angeles' DOC-centric emergency operations model is dependent on the successful performance of DOCs; however, each DOC has its own understanding of its purpose and the degree of DOC capabilities varies widely in the absence of a centralized policy and framework.	9.1.1. Departments/agencies in need of DOC guidance will continue to proactively contact the EMD for support and information on best practices. EMD will provide support, including for the development of DOC ConOps Plans (9.1.4), upon request.	Planning Organization Training	High	All Departments/Agencies/Bureaus with DOCs/BOCs	Emergency Management Coordinators	In Progress	Ongoing
		9.1.2. EMD will distribute its "DOC Training" materials to all departments via the EMC Operations Subcommittee.	Training	High	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	February 2016	March 2016
		9.1.3. The EMD will host a Train-the-Trainer session for its "DOC Training" open to all departments.	Training	High	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	February 2016	August 2016
		9.1.4. All departments with DOCs will develop a DOC Concept of Operations	Planning	High	All Departments/Agencies/Bureaus with DOCs/BOCs	Emergency Management Coordinators	February 2016	February 2017

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
		(ConOps) if one doesn't exist covering all critical elements addressed in SEMS and in EMD's "DOC Training."						
	9.2: Departments do not have enough trained staff to perform DOC functions for full DOC activations or to cover operations lasting more than one Operational Period.	9.2.1. All departments with DOCs will develop a recommended staffing plan for their DOC (positions and depth) for approval by their respective department's leadership.	Planning Organization	Medium	All Departments/Agencies/Bureaus with DOCs/BOCs	Emergency Management Coordinators	February 2016	August 2017
	9.3: A Common Operating Picture (COP) and Citywide priorities were not communicated to each DOC from the EOC.	9.3.1. Checklists for Agency Representatives, Branch Directors, and Unit Leaders (as appropriate), will be revised to include prompts for providing briefings/updates from the EOC to DOCs on a regular basis and shall identify essential elements of information to include in those updates. (Similar to how EOC Section Coordinator checklists will provide the same for their Section staff).	Planning	Medium	EMD	Planning Unit	February 2016	August 2016
		9.3.2. EOC training will continue to, and be enhanced as necessary to emphasize, the importance of providing two-way information between the	Training	Medium	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	In Progress	Ongoing

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
		DOCs and EOC, and emphasize the role of Agency Representatives, Branch Directors and Unit Leaders (as appropriate) in relaying information back to DOCs and not just from DOCs to the EOC.						
		Per Corrective Action 1.1.4 from the 2014 Functional Exercise AAR, the EMD continue to pursue the development of a formal program to certify/credential EOC responders through a combination of testing, training, exercise, and/or real-world experience (e.g., formalizing existing efforts and filling in gaps as necessary over time) and issue said policy through appropriate channels (e.g., Mayoral Memo) to maintain a capable cadre of EOC responders and a constant state of EOC readiness.	Planning Organization	High	EMD	Operations Division	Ongoing	April 2017
	9.4: WebEOC is not currently available at DOCs, but could help improve DOC/EOC communications if made available.	9.4.1. The EMD will continue its efforts to acquire funding for the expansion of WebEOC to the City's DOCs.	Equipment	High	EMD	Operations Division	In Progress	August 2016
		9.4.2. Through the EMC Operations Subcommittee, the EMD will seek guidance from DOCs on how to	Equipment	High	EMD	Operations Division	June 2016	February 2017

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
		customize WebEOC for DOC use and how to structure the system to best facilitate the interface between the EOC and DOCs.						
		9.4.3. When and if WebEOC is expanded to DOCs, then EMD will expand its WebEOC training offerings (both content and frequency) to address DOC responders.	Training	High	EMD	Operations Division	Contingent Upon Corrective Action 9.4.1	Ongoing
Objective 10: Evaluate the ability of City of Los Angeles departments and agencies to select and implement appropriate continuity strategies as a result of personnel absenteeism rates between 30% - 50%.	10.1: The importance of activating Department COOP Plans or implementing continuity strategies was not recognized as a priority by the EOC or most DOCs despite the scenario.	10.1.1. As a supplement to the City-wide COOP Plan Template issued by the EMD, the EMD will develop guidelines or suggested trigger points that better explain under what conditions a General Manager should consider activation of their department COOP plan.	Planning	Medium	EMD	Planning Unit	February 2016	August 2016
		10.1.2. Associated with Corrective Action 9.1.4, Departments will include trigger points for or references to the activation of department COOP Plans in their DOC ConOps Plans.	Planning	High	All Departments/Agencies/Bureaus with DOCs/BOCs	Emergency Management Coordinators	February 2016	February 2017
	10.2: DOC personnel were unaware of the process for requesting additional staff (non-	10.2.1. EMD training will continue to address the resource request process applicable to all resource types.	Training	Low	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	February 2016	August 2016

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
	emergency, emergency, DSW, and otherwise) from the EOC.	10.2.2. EOC/DOC training materials will be revised to include at least one example of a personnel resource request to reinforce that personnel requests follow the same process as all other tangible resource requests.	Training	Low	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	February 2016	August 2016
11: Effectively demonstrate the activation of the Disaster Service Worker (DSW) program across all city departments/agencies; and have each department support the mobilization of one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel per twelve (12)-hour shift in accordance with the "Activation of the Disaster Service Worker Program Standard Operating Procedure" (dated 10/10/2014).	11.1: Awareness of, and training on, the DSW activation Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is limited and may currently result in single points of failure. The exercise demonstrated there are insufficient resources to implement the program to acquire large numbers of personnel.	11.1.1. The DSW SOP will be revised to include procedures for coordination between Department DPOs and their respective DOCs or Department Leadership.	Planning	High	EMD	Special Projects Division	February 2016	August 2016
		11.1.2. The DSW SOP will be revised to include procedures for how DPOs will properly mobilize DSW personnel.	Planning	High	EMD	Special Projects Division	February 2016	August 2016
		11.1.3. Department DPOs should pre-establish job classification lists (per the DSW SOP) for the personnel of their respective department.	Planning Organization	Medium	Personnel Department	All DPOs	February 2016	February 2017
		11.1.4. The "Implementation and Training" section of the DSW SOP will be enhanced to include a more robust training and exercise strategy that includes a list of types of trainings and exercises to be conducted, an inclusive list of all individuals/ positions that	Planning Training Exercise	High	EMD	Special Projects Division	February 2016	August 2016

Objective	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>1</sup>	Priority	Primary Responsible Organization	Responsible Unit/Division	Start Date	Completion Date
		need training, the target audience for each type of training, and the frequency of offerings. The training and exercises will reflect a building-block approach that grows in complexity and capability with each offering. The EMD and Personnel Department will apply the appropriate resources to implement the enhanced training and exercise strategy identified.						
	11.2: DOCs were not made aware of the activation of the DSW program.	11.2.1. The EOC 909 Form will be revised to include a check box to identify whether the DSW program has been activated.	Planning	Medium	EMD	Planning Unit	February 2016	March 2016
	11.3: The functionality of the DSW program and its personnel resources were misunderstood by many elements in the EOC.	11.3.1. EMD will develop a one-page fact sheet explaining the DSW program's purpose, authorities, and general process.	Planning	Low	EMD	Special Projects Division	August 2016	February 2017
		11.3.2. The EOC 301 training will be revised to mention and quickly explain the DSW program.	Training	Low	EMD	Operations Division, Training Unit	August 2016	February 2017

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## APPENDIX B: EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

Participating Organizations	Level of Play
<b>City of Los Angeles</b>	
Animal Services	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation and Drill Activities
Department of Building and Safety (DBS)	City EOC Staffing
Department on Disability	City EOC Staffing
Department of Public Works/Bureau of Contract Admin (BCA)	City EOC Staffing
Department of Public Works/Bureau of Engineering (BOE)	City EOC Staffing (GIS only)
Department of Public Works/Bureau of Sanitation (BOS)	City EOC Staffing, BOC Activation
Department of Public Works/Bureau of Street Lighting (Street Lighting)	City EOC Staffing
Department of Public Works/Bureau of Street Services (BSS)	City EOC Staffing
Department of Recreation and Parks	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation
Department of Transportation	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation
Department of Water and Power	City EOC Staffing
Emergency Management Department	City EOC Staffing
Fire Department	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation
General Services Department (GSD)	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation
Harbor Department/Port of Los Angeles	City EOC Staffing
Housing & Community Investment Department (HCIDLA)	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation
Housing Authority (HACLA)	City EOC Staffing
Information Technology Agency (ITA)	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation
Los Angeles World Airports	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation
Office of the Chief Legislative Analyst	City EOC Staffing
Office of the City Clerk	DOC Simulation
Office of the City Administrative Officer	City EOC Staffing
Personnel Department	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation
Police Department	City EOC Staffing, DOC Activation
<b>County</b>	
Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management	City EOC Staffing
Los Angeles County Department of Public Health	City EOC Staffing
<b>Other Stakeholders</b>	
American Red Cross (ARC) - Greater Los Angeles Chapter	City EOC Staffing, EOC Activation
Los Angeles Unified School District	City EOC Staffing
Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Foundation	City EOC Staffing, BOC Activation

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## APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK SUMMARY

<b>Number of Respondents</b>	Ninety-five (95)
<b>% Who had participated in prior EOC trainings</b>	<p>76% of respondents had taken <b>EOC 101</b></p> <p>71% of respondents had taken <b>EOC 201</b></p> <p>61% of respondents had taken <b>EOC 301</b></p>
<b>Summary of Demonstrated Strengths</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Teamwork (78%)<sup>2</sup></li> <li>• EOC processes worked well (69%)</li> <li>• Use of WebEOC (16%)</li> <li>• Resources were helpful (9%)</li> <li>• Facility capabilities facilitated functions (4%)</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<b>Summary of Areas for Improvement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Section coordination (41%)</li> <li>• Information sharing and flow (33%)</li> <li>• Resource request coordination and process (24%)</li> <li>• Understanding of EOC roles (21%)</li> <li>• Streamlining of paperwork required to complete processes (8%)</li> <li>• Ability to maintain situational awareness (7%)</li> </ul>
<b>Summary of Recommended Improvements</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Equipment and facilities (40%)</li> <li>• WebEOC (35%)</li> <li>• Smoother processes (32%)</li> <li>• More exercises and training (20%)</li> <li>• Real-time mapping capabilities (3%)</li> </ul>

### FEEDBACK DETAILS

The feedback details contained here include an analysis and consolidation of the feedback received on all ninety-five (95) Participant Feedback Forms. Both paper and electronic (Survey Monkey) responses were reviewed. All comments were not included verbatim in this analysis; however, all comments were considered and consolidated into representative and like feedback entries. Specific and detailed comments were included as appropriate. Illegible comments were not included. In addition, comment modifiers are not included (e.g., if “staff support” was listed

<sup>2</sup> Percentages show the percentage of total respondents that shared the same or similar comment.

as a strength that is how it is listed below). Comments that received multiple responses were noted with a percentage indicating the percentage of the total respondents that made a similar comment.

## DEMONSTRATED STRENGTHS

### Teamwork (78%)

- Open communication between agencies. (21%)
- Collaborative environment made information sharing a success. (8%)
- Branch leaders are excellent, knowledgeable resources. (2%)
- Strong collaboration with BOC. (2%)
- Smooth phone communication with LADWP.
- Creative problem solving.
- Good communication with LAFD DOC.
- LAPD successfully communicated within and across sections.
- Smooth DOC to EOC communication for both Recs and Parks and Mass Care.
- Coordination between Section Coordinators much improved.
- Excellent communication between LAPD/DOT/LAFD.
- Proximity of so many different agencies allows for efficiency in coordinating response.
- Strong teamwork made up for individual lack of familiarity.
- Experienced RACR personnel assisted with the success of Law Branch.
- Very engaged CLA representative.
- Increased BOC integration.
- Increase in awareness of DAFN issues, positions, and responsibilities.
- Communication with Mass Care DOC was strong.
- Communication with LAAS DOC was strong.
- LAWA DOC staff was very well prepared.
- Effective communications support between PIO DOC and Operations DOC.
- Strong team dynamic across groups.
- Flexibility demonstrated in response to changing needs.
- BOC partnerships with VOADs and the private sector.
- Recs and Parks had great communication with GSD.

### Process (69%)

- Successful problem-solving and policy-level decisions made across the board. (3%)
- Increased knowledge of ICS. (3%)
- Learned the importance of prioritizing needs. (2%)
- Strong command presence demonstrated by EOC Director. (2%)
- Processing of injects in a timely manner. (2%)
- Resource request and tracking systems greatly improved. (2%)
- Vetting of information. (2%)
- Effective area coordination and management response.
- Smooth check-in.
- Great test of the City's resources; incident showed where challenges would occur.

- Efficient cost accounting.
- Strong staff delegation of work.
- Knowledge of Nixle System.
- Successful management of a major incident JIC.
- Successful rumor control.
- Management of EOC objectives.

### **WebEOC (16%)**

- Much more intuitive than previous years. (3%)
- Support from EMD was welcome for WebEOC.
- Allowed for easy follow-ups.
- Very helpful tool to track DOC and resource requests.
- Liaison representatives that did not have DOCs open continued to use WebEOC to simulate communications.

### **Resources (9%)**

- Seating chart was very useful. (3%)
- Map of local declaration early in operational period. (2%)
- Staff coordination made possible by availability of personnel contact information.
- Dry erase boards provided a great resource for Situational Awareness.
- Vests made identification of team members much easier.
- Successful radio communication.

### **Facility (4%)**

- Camera feeds were very helpful.

## **AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT**

### **Section-Specific Coordination (41%)**

- Not enough input from Public Health. (5%)
- Need for LADOT Mutual Aid agreement. (3%)
- LAFD DOC integration needs improvement.
- Liaison section would benefit from the addition of a Deputy Liaison Officer.
- There is not enough staff in the Planning section to handle the critical planning tasks.
- Mass Care would benefit from the addition of a Deputy Section Coordinator.
- LAUSD communication needs improvement.
- Everbridge notifications were not received (LAWA).
- Public Health seemed out of line with the reality of the situation.
- Recs and Parks DOC lacked SOP knowledge.
- PIO had difficulty coordinating with outside agency PIOs in the absence of OA JIC.
- Information sharing between Area Commands and LAFD DOC was lacking.
- The BOC would benefit from an additional BOC Controller for comprehensive tracking purposes.

- LAUSD needs to investigate the status of MOU/MOAs already in place.
- Agency reps felt very disconnected.
- DWP felt they could prepare better.
  - Pre-populate a list of facility addresses and phone numbers in the event access to DWP intranet is unavailable.
  - Pre-load key documents, plans, phone-lists, etc. on to thumb drives.
- The Donation & Resource Coordination process is a two-person job.

### **Information Sharing and Flow (33%)**

- Better configuration of WebEOC for BOC use.
- Communication at all levels can be improved.
  
- Distilling and vetting information proved difficult.
- Visible lack of information sharing within sections.
- Need more staff for information management and capturing of data.
- Consider creating a chart/graph to show how information flows in the EOC.

### **Resource Request Coordination and Process (24%)**

- Delay on return of rejected requests made correction of forms difficult.
- No confirmation of DSW request being received and/or fulfilled.
  
- Many requests went unfulfilled.
- Locating resources was challenging.
- Follow-up was slow or lacked closure. (4%)
- Logistics failed to provide resource request updates. (3%)
- Lack of ability to coordinate and document need-assessment with donation specifications.
- Unclear where to get information regarding DSW activation.

### **Understanding of Roles (21%)**

- General lack of understanding of role/responsibilities limited player coordination. (4%)
- Many were unaware of their roles/responsibilities because they were first-time players. (2%)
- Law Branch was inundated with requests not related to their positions.
- Need to determine which requests are handled by the Logistics Section and which are handled by other sections.

### **Streamline Paperwork Process (8%)**

- The overall process needs to be more organized. (4%)
- Change “New Item” on ICS-214 form to “New Op Period” for more clarity. (3%)
- Overwhelming bottleneck regarding resource requests.

### **Situational Awareness (7%)**

- Lack of real-time updates displayed in EOC.

- BOC members severely lacked Situational Awareness.
- Management lacked situational awareness due to lack of Planning Section updates.

### **Other (5%)**

- City employees need to be assured that they will receive prophylactic medications. (2%)
- Personnel list should include “other languages spoken.”
- Every City department should participate in these exercises.
- Alternate EOC members were not well-prepared/experienced.

## **APPLICABLE PLANS/POLICIES/PROCEDURES, EQUIPMENT, ORGANIZATION/STRUCTURE, AND/OR TRAINING THAT SHOULD BE REVISED, DEVELOPED, OR ACQUIRED TO IMPROVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN THE CITY.**

### **Equipment and Facility (40%)**

- Difficulty using/understanding Google Drive. (4%)
  - Poor internet connection. (3%)
  - Insufficient bandwidth available for large groups. (3%)
  - Printing was difficult. (3%)
  - Technical malfunctions need quick alternative solutions.
  - Video conferencing systems did not function well.
  - Some phones did not work.
  - BOC needs a high-speed scanner and copier.
  - BOC requests two additional wall-mounted LCD screens.
  - Forms being displayed on large monitors need to be large enough for all to read.
  - More communication equipment needed.
- In previous years the main screen projected major incidents.

### **WebEOC (35%)**

- BOC members need individual and wider WebEOC access. (4%)
- More IT staff needed. (4%)
- WebEOC training should be made mandatory. (4%)
- Lack of training in WebEOC led to poor communication and hindered EOC process. (2%)
- Email/messaging is too cumbersome.
- Unable to easily forward resource requests.
- Message notification system is inefficient.
- Not flexible enough for situation reporting.
- Need more training.
- Applying communications protocols within WebEOC was confusing.

### **Process (32%)**

- Chain of command was unclear. (4%)
- PIO messages were delayed. (3%)
- Difficult to process injects in a timely manner.
- Lack of familiarity regarding report processing.
- Difficult to track completed tasks.
- DPH protocols were unclear.

### **Need More Exercise and Training (20%)**

- More training will lead to higher levels of role proficiency. (7%)
- LADOT needs wider EOC and DOC training.
- Training requested for EOC procurement policies.
- Future trainings should include information on the capabilities of the BOC.


### **Mapping (3%)**

- GIS maps were not universally available. (2%)
- Printing maps slows down the EOC process.

## EXERCISE ASSESSMENT

Survey Data	Strongly Disagree			Strongly Agree		Total Respondents*	Average Rating
	1	2	3	4	5		
A. The exercise objectives associated with my position, Section, or location were achieved.	2	6	14	47	24	<b>92</b>	<b>3.91</b>
B. The exercise was well structured and organized.	2	6	12	49	24	<b>91</b>	<b>3.94</b>
C. The public health scenario presented a new and challenging content for the exercise.	1	0	14	33	47	<b>95</b>	<b>4.32</b>
D. I understood how to perform the functions and tasks associated with my position and section.	1	6	17	41	27	<b>92</b>	<b>3.95</b>
E. EOC/DOC responders, including me, understood each other's responsibilities and worked collectively to achieve EOC/DOC objectives.	6	6	20	35	22	<b>89</b>	<b>3.69</b>
F. Information sharing within and among the EOC, DOCs, and with other emergency partners was effective.	6	13	27	26	21	<b>93</b>	<b>3.46</b>
G. I maintained Situational Awareness throughout the exercise because procedures were clearly communicated and followed.	4	7	31	27	23	<b>92</b>	<b>3.63</b>
H. My department/organization needs to improve its Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Disaster Service Worker (DSW) protocols to better weather a similar incident.	2	7	31	35	18	<b>93</b>	<b>3.65</b>
I. As a result of this exercise, I have a better understanding of how to respond in accordance with LA City procedures in an emergency.	2	1	8	49	33	<b>93</b>	<b>4.18</b>

2015 LA Functional Exercise Assessment Factors



## EXERCISE CONDUCT FEEDBACK

### Strengths:

- Great, well-developed exercise.
- Injects felt realistic.
- Very believable Level 3 incident.
- Very realistic experience.
- This exercise presented unique challenges.
- Participants were much better about interacting with each other.

### Areas for Improvement:

- High amount of duplicate work/communications.
- Spreading the exercise over two days (a full operational period) would be beneficial.
- Dispensing of injects needs improvement.
- Controllers seemed unclear on how to respond to injects.
- EOC infrastructure needs improvement (phones, computers, printers, etc.).
- The importance of updating logs needs to be addressed.
- Software interface needs to be more functionally based.
- Wireless connectivity needs improvement.

- Weather conditions should be mentioned at some point during the exercise.
- This should have been a police-led exercise.
- No “all-clear” message was issued for City employees.
- The most significant challenge is always the flow of information.
- Establish MOUs with clear deliverables.
- The amount of information that needed analysis quickly became overwhelming.

