

TRADE, TRAVEL AND TOURISM COMMITTEE

SeaTac Horizon Air Theft

Presentation Objectives:

Incident Summary

Insider Threat Indicators

Regulatory Implications

Prevention at LAX

SeaTac Incident Summary

August 10, 2018



Richard Russell

29 years old

Horizon Air, 3.5 years




Bombardier Q400

- Ground Service Agent: towing and pushing aircraft for takeoff and gate approach; de-icing; and, handling baggage.
- Reportedly “learned” to operate aircraft via flight simulator. The Q400 aircraft has no locking mechanism. A series of switches need to be activated in a particular order to start the aircraft.

Incident Summary

1. Aircraft accessed while parked in Cargo 1 maintenance area.
2. Russell uses tug to rotate aircraft 180 degrees; enters plane.
3. Taxi to runway 16C.
4. 7:32 PM: Russell ignores requests from tower to ID self / flight number; plane takes off.
 - 8:47 PM: After 75 minutes of flight through Puget Sound, aircraft crashes into Ketron Island in apparent suicide; no other casualties.



PC Based Flight Simulation Games

(Available for Purchase)

Bombardier Dash 8 Q400
Part Number: FlyJSim-Dash8-Q400
On sale: \$25.00
Retail Price: \$35.00
Your Savings: \$10.00

Quantity

1 **ADD TO CART**

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Flight Simulation Program Includes:

- Accurate Flight Characteristics
- Detailed Exterior Model
- Highly Accurate 3D Cockpit
- High Resolution EFIS Displays
- Detailed Interior & Exterior Night Lights
- Custom Sounds
- Weight & Balance Manager
- Requires Base Simulation Software and Joy Stick (<\$125.00)

Similar Incident

July 18, 2012

St. George Municipal Airport, Utah

- Suspended SkyWest Captain Brian Hedglin, suspected in the murder of his girlfriend, scaled the perimeter fence and entered an out-of-service SkyWest CRJ200 aircraft.
- He taxied and crashed through the fence, disabling the aircraft.
- Hedglin died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound inside the plane.



Brian
Hedglin



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Regulatory Implications

Who's to Blame?

"Airport security is everyone's responsibility"

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Section 1544.225

- Security of aircraft and facilities
- Prevent unauthorized access to areas controlled by the aircraft operator
- Conduct a security inspection of each aircraft before placing it into passenger operations

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 1544-Domestic Carriers and 1546-International Carriers.

- Airlines are held accountable for unattended/unsecured aircrafts

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Section 1542. 201 and 1542.2013

- The Airport Operator is responsible for establishing and carrying out security measures for controlling entry to Secured/ AOA areas.
- The Airport Operator is required to prevent and detect the unauthorized entry, presence, and movement of individuals, and ground vehicles into and within the Secured/ AOA areas.

What can be done to help prevent an incident like this?

- Work with industry associations to look for ways to better secure aircraft when not in use.
- Continue to strengthen insider threat strategies.

Working with Industry Associations

- Secure aircraft doors.
- Secure cockpit doors when plane is not in use
- Disable engine starting capability by using some sort of unique identifier.

Regulatory Enforcement at LAX

TSA Inspection Program

- Active on AOA everyday looking for regulatory violations.

Airport Operations

- Airport Operations Superintendents active on AOA

Airport Police Patrol Support (Z Units)

- APD Manual Section 8/2.9, check for unattended parked aircraft parked; access doors found to be in an open position
- Airfield Enforcement (SIDA, Vehicles, Suspicious Activity)

Vulnerability Assessment & Analysis Unit (VAAU)

- Enforcement of all regulatory compliance rules and policy

Regulatory Enforcement (Continued)

Joint Field Operations Task Force

- Designed to prevent, detect, apprehend suspect and deter criminal activity
- Joint collaboration with various Public Safety Entities (i.e.. CBP, TSA,FAM,FBI,LAPD,LAX)
- Building rapport with tenants and employees
- High visibility in all areas of the airport

Challenge Procedures

- Shared by all individuals with unescorted access privileges to LAX Secure Area/SIDA
- Direct Challenges-non confrontational verbal contacts whose behavior may lead to imminent danger to oneself or public (person / property)
- In Direct Challenges-Keeping individual(s) in sight and contact Law Enforcement

Pre-operational “Insider Threat” Indicators

(U) What Are Potential Job-Specific Insider Threat Behaviors?

<u>(U) On-Aircraft & On-Ramp Providers¹</u>	<u>(U) In-Terminal Providers¹</u>	<u>(U) Outside-Terminal Providers¹</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (U) Access abuse• (U) Loitering outside of duty areas• (U) Arrival or departure with unusual items or luggage• (U) Cargo theft and other criminal activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (U) Additional access sought• (U) Loitering outside of duty areas• (U) Theft of official vehicles, uniforms, identification, and access cards• (U) Unusual inquiries made about sterile side security procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (U) Overly willing to run sensitive routes and pick-ups• (U) Additional access sought• (U) Loitering outside of duty areas• (U) Extended parking in a restricted area• (U) Surveillance of persons or vehicles passing through

- Theory behind pre-operational indicators.
- Acts are rarely perpetrated without planning.
- Belief that an individual's behavior can be a clue.
- Routinely discussed at airport security briefings by our intel analysts.

Prevention

Airport Police Officers, VAAU Officers and Airport Operations Superintendents:

- Renewed emphasis on the enforcement of unattended aircraft.
- APD Manual Section 8/2.9. Officers shall check for unattended parked aircraft with doors in the open position.

Prevention

“Challenging Suspicious Behavior Campaign”

Identify inappropriate behavior(s)

- Notify Authorities (**Text 67911**)
- AWARE Campaign (“ Airport Security is everyone’s responsibility”)
- Engage inappropriate activity on Ramps and Aprons.
- Enhance Security of Jet Bridges, Maintenance Hangars.

Challenge Suspicious
Behavior



Prevention

Improved employee screening:

- Security Badge Office- FBI recurring vetting in place (Rap Back Program).
- SIDA badge limits airfield access.
- An enhanced employee screening pilot program is currently in place at T-4 Connector. TSA partnership. New screening lane is screening 44,000 employees a month.
- ATLAS Program- Cooperative effort between TSA and APD. Unannounced random screening at access portals. Employees should expect to be inspected.
- Enhanced employee screening study currently underway with the help of a consultant.
- ACAMS- Improved access control measures with the help of bio-metrics.

Prevention

Availability of mental health resources at LAX:

- Full time mental health clinician in field with APD.
- APD officers have received enhanced mental health training.
- Officers frequently deal with individuals in crisis.

Questions?